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ARTICLES
LABOR VALUES ARE FIRST AMENDMENT
VALUES: WHY UNION COMPREHENSIVE
CAMPAIGNS ARE PROTECTED SPEECH
Charlotte Garden*
Corporate targets of union “comprehensive campaigns” increasingly
have responded by filing civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) lawsuits alleging that unions’ speech and
petitioning activities are extortionate. These lawsuits are the descendants
of the Supreme Court’s unexplained treatment of much labor speech as less
worthy of protection than other types of speech. Starting from the position
that speech that promotes democratic discourse deserves top-tier First
Amendment protection, I argue that labor speech—which plays a unique
role in civil society—should be on an equal footing with civil rights speech.
Thus, even if union advocacy qualifies as legal extortion, the First
Amendment should trump civil RICO enforcement, with two limited
exceptions: speech that is actually malicious, and speech that imminently
threatens to force an employer to choose between breaking the law and
suffering significant economic harm or shutting its doors altogether.
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INTRODUCTION
Union density—the percentage of the eligible workforce that is
represented by a union—is falling in the United States. Among private
employers, it has been falling since the 1950s and is now well below ten
percent, far lower than in previous decades. 1 Unless unions come up with
new strategies to organize workers this is unlikely to change, particularly
given employers’ impressive track records at defeating traditional
organizing methods. 2 In response, unions are increasingly waging
1. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, UNION MEMBERS SUMMARY (2011), available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
2. See generally Kate Bronfenbrenner, Final Report: The Effects of Plant Closing or
Threat of Plant Closing on the Right of Workers To Organize, DIGITALCOMMONS@ILR
INT’L
PUBLICATIONS
(Sept.
30,
1996),
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=intl.
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“comprehensive campaigns” in pursuit of employer neutrality, recognition,
first contracts, and the like. During comprehensive campaigns, unions
deploy a range of tactics, including teaming up with community groups to
criticize the company’s record on labor, environmental, and other issues of
concern to the public and company stakeholders; lobbying city governments
to pass resolutions condemning the company; opposing the company in the
regulatory arena (such as by opposing permit applications); and organizing
boycotts of the employer’s goods. 3
Employers hate comprehensive campaigns. They can span decades, they
can harm the employers’ reputations, and they can be costly to fight. (And,
they sometimes result in unionization or a contract.) Increasingly,
employers are responding by filing civil racketeering actions.4 These suits
allege that a comprehensive campaign is extortionate in that it leverages the
employer’s fear of economic loss to obtain property, in the form of either a
neutrality or card-check agreement or, more tangibly, union dues or
increased wages and benefits. 5 Additionally, they may also allege that the
comprehensive campaign’s goal was illegal.6 For example, in Smithfield v.
United Food & Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW), 7 the
complaint alleged that the union sought to compel company recognition of
the union as its employees’ exclusive representative, even though the union
lacked majority support. 8 However, other suits simply focus on the fact
that employers have no legal obligation to agree to certain union demands,
such as remaining neutral during an organizing campaign. 9
It is unclear what role the First Amendment plays in protecting unions
from civil liability under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
3. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1527, 1605 & n.326 (2002).
4. There have been fewer than twenty such suits filed since 1980. James J. Brudney,
Collateral Conflict: Employer Claims of RICO Extortion Against Union Comprehensive
Campaigns
27
&
nn.131–33
(Dec.
2009),
available
at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=james_brudney.
However, the filing of three such suits within the space of a year might suggest that
employers are beginning to view civil RICO as a more attractive way of fighting union
organizing campaigns. See generally Cintas Corp. v. UNITE HERE, 601 F. Supp. 2d 571
(S.D.N.Y.) (complaint filed March 5, 2008, alleging civil RICO violation and trademark
infringement), aff’d, 355 F. App’x 508 (2d Cir. 2009); Wackenhut Corp. v. Serv. Emps. Int’l
Union, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (complaint filed Nov. 1, 2007 in the Southern
District of New York, then transferred to the Southern District of Florida under Case no.
9:07-cv-81090, alleging civil RICO violation); Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. United Food &
Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 585 F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. Va. 2008) (complaint filed Oct.
17, 2007, alleging violations of civil RICO and various North Carolina torts). Similarly,
Sodexo recently filed a complaint against the Service Employees International Union and
others, bringing civil RICO and tort claims. Complaint at 113–24, Sodexo, Inc. v. Serv.
Emps. Int’l Union, No. 1:11-cv-276 (E.D. Va. Mar. 17, 2011).
5. See supra note 4.
6. For example, Smithfield alleged that the United Food & Commercial Workers’s
(UFCW) comprehensive campaign had an illegal goal, whereas Wackenhut and Cintas did
not.
7. 585 F. Supp. 2d 789.
8. See generally First Amended Complaint, Smithfield, 585 F. Supp. 2d 789 (No.
3:07CV641), 2008 WL 1825139.
9. See infra notes 77–80 and accompanying text.
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Organizations Act (RICO) for their advocacy during comprehensive
campaigns. For example, the Smithfield court rejected wholesale the
union’s First Amendment defense, concluding that “the First Amendment
simply does not protect extortion.” 10 However, it is clear that the same
conduct carried out by civil rights protesters pursuing “political” goals
would have a much stronger claim to First Amendment protection. In
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 11 the Supreme Court held that the
First Amendment protected coercive speech—speech that was significantly
more coercive than that involved in most comprehensive campaigns—when
it was part of a civil rights campaign. 12 Importantly, though, the Claiborne
Hardware Court went on to state that tactically similar labor speech aimed
at achieving traditional union goals fell somewhere lower down the ladder
because labor’s goals are “economic” rather than political.13 Likewise, the
Court has on other occasions stated that labor picketing and secondary
boycotts are subject to regulation simply because they are coercive—even if
they are motivated by purely political, and not economic, goals. 14
In this Article, I argue that most labor speech employed in
comprehensive campaigns should receive heightened First Amendment
protection because of its important role in facilitating democratic discourse
and deliberation. 15 Accounts of the First Amendment that focus on popular
sovereignty and democratic discourse have failed to consider fully the role
of associations in promoting such discourse. Yet associations perform tasks
that are crucial to a well-functioning democracy: encouraging deliberation
about shared interests and goals; acting as microcosms where members can
develop civic skills and a heightened sense of their social roles; providing a
check on government by promoting social solidarity independent from the
state; and aggregating and amplifying their members’ voices. 16
Thus, my argument is, first, that associational speech belongs on the
highest rung of the First Amendment hierarchy, and second, that union
speech is an important component of associational speech. In that regard,
unions, like other associations, perform deliberation-enhancing and statechecking functions.
First, because unions are relatively formal
democracies, they can serve as schools for democracy 17 in which members
must engage in meaningful deliberation to keep the union running
smoothly. Second, unions’ relative diversity provides opportunities for
members to forge new social bonds, facilitating group interdependence.
10. Smithfield, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 805 (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting United States v. Boyd, 231 F. App’x 314, 315–16 (5th Cir. 2007)).
11. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
12. Id. at 928–29.
13. Id. at 912.
14. E.g., Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 225–26 (1982)
(holding that secondary boycott launched to protest Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could be
enjoined consistent with the First Amendment).
15. In this Article, I will use the words “discourse” and “deliberation” interchangeably.
16. See generally JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL
THEORY (1992).
17. See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835).
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Third, unions can act directly in the political process as a partial
counterweight to the interests of those with the easiest access to political
power. Fourth, unions may encourage members’ political participation, as
there is at least some empirical evidence that union members are more
likely than the rest of the public to participate in government, by engaging
in activities such as volunteering for a political candidate or writing a letter
to the editor.
So far, I have focused on only one side of First Amendment balancing.
But of course, even top-tier First Amendment protection can be overcome
by a compelling and narrowly-tailored state interest. Ultimately, I conclude
that the interests advanced by civil RICO cannot surmount unions’ First
Amendment interests in nonviolent comprehensive campaign advocacy,
except if the unions’ speech (1) is actually malicious under New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan 18 or (2) imminently threatens to force the employer to
choose between taking an illegal action and suffering serious financial
harm.
Part I of this Article describes comprehensive campaigns and the civil
RICO lawsuits targeting them. Part II discusses the current state of the law
governing First Amendment protection for union expressive activity. Part
III argues that speech that enhances civil society, including union speech,
deserves the highest level of First Amendment protection because of its role
in promoting deliberative democracy. Finally, Part IV argues that the First
Amendment should provide a defense to most civil RICO suits, though the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) may be able to continue to
regulate comprehensive campaigns without violating unions’ First
Amendment rights.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Union Comprehensive Campaigns
It is no surprise that union density is falling in the United States and has
been for decades. In 2008, only 12.4% of workers—16.1 million
workers—belonged to a union.19 Just fifteen years earlier, 20% of workers
belonged to a union,20 and, in 1945, more than one-third of non-agricultural
workers were union members. 21 This decline has continued even though
“unionized workers tend to be paid more and are more likely to be covered

18. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
19. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, UNION MEMBERS SUMMARY (2009), available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01282009.htm.
Unions represented
another 1.7 million non-members. Id.
20. Id.
21. ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 229 (1998); Daniel B. Cornfield &
Bill Fletcher, The U.S. Labor Movement: Toward a Sociology of Labor Revitalization, in
SOURCEBOOK OF LABOR MARKETS: EVOLVING STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES 61, 61 (Ivar
Berg & Arne L. Kalleberg eds., 2001).
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by a broader set of employer-provided fringe benefits than nonunion
workers.” 22
To reverse this trend, unions have begun waging “comprehensive
campaigns.” These campaigns, also known as “corporate,” “coordinated,”
or “strategic” campaigns, 23 are prolonged organizing efforts designed to
pressure employers into agreeing to union demands. A union may seek
employer neutrality during a union organizing drive or an alternative union
election process, such as a card-check, instead of an NLRB-sponsored
election.
Comprehensive campaigns simultaneously target multiple
employer pressure points—employees, customers, shareholders, directors,
regulators, and the public at large—by “appeal[ing] directly to the public by
way of rallies, pickets, speeches, and leafleting in public streets and parks,
often with the active support of churches and other community
organizations outside the labor movement itself.”24
Comprehensive campaigns differ from more traditional labor organizing
tactics in a few respects. First, they move the locus of the dispute from the
plant floor or the picket line out into the community and sometimes across
state and national borders. Second, they involve both labor unions and
other community, religious, and activist organizations and thus rally a broad
base of support that goes beyond labor’s immediate constituency. Third,
they move away from traditional labor rhetoric and include the concerns of
the civil rights, environmental, and consumer protection movements, among
others, which sometimes conveys the impression that those organizations—
and not the labor union—are the driving force behind the various rallies,
press releases, and other campaign events.
However, “comprehensive campaign” is not subject to precise definition.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has observed that the
equivalent term “corporate campaign”
encompasses a wide and indefinite range of legal and potentially illegal
tactics used by unions to exert pressure on an employer. These tactics may
include, but are not limited to, litigation, political appeals, requests that
regulatory agencies investigate and pursue employer violations of state or
federal law, and negative publicity campaigns aimed at reducing the
employer’s goodwill with employees, investors, or the general public. 25

22. Cornfield & Fletcher, supra note 21, at 66 (“[O]ver time, union wages are
consistently higher than nonunion wages for all demographic groups.”).
23. Much of the literature discussing these campaigns from employers’ perspectives uses
the term “corporate campaign,” whereas unions have come to favor “comprehensive
campaign.” Brudney, supra note 4, at 7 & nn.23–24. This Article uses the term
“comprehensive campaign.”
24. Estlund, supra note 3, at 1605; see also Brudney, supra note 4, at 1 (“Coordinated
campaign tactics include publicity efforts aimed at attracting media attention and consumer
interest; regulatory reviews initiated to focus on a company’s possible health, safety,
environmental, or zoning violations; and investigations of a company’s financial status
through use of pension funds or other shareholder resources.”).
25. Food Lion, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 103 F.3d 1007,
1014 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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It is unclear whether comprehensive campaigns actually affect employers’
economic performance. 26 However, employers bringing civil RICO suits
claim that they do, 27 and there is some evidence that comprehensive
campaigns can convince an employer to agree to maintain a publically
neutral stance toward union organizing or to hold an alternative union
election, such as a card-check—both of which make it more likely that
employees will vote to unionize. 28
B. Civil RICO as a Response to Union Comprehensive Campaigns
To state a claim under the civil RICO statute, an employer must plead a
pattern or practice of racketeering activity, as evidenced by two or more
commissions of “predicate crimes” from an enumerated list. 29 In civil
RICO cases arising out of comprehensive campaigns, the predicate crime
alleged is generally extortion. Though violations of state or federal
extortion law can generally be a RICO predicate, the Supreme Court
requires that the conduct also qualify as “‘generic’ extortion,” defined as
“‘obtaining something of value from another with his consent induced by
the wrongful use of force, fear, or threats.’” 30
Civil RICO is only the most recent vehicle by which employers have
filed lawsuits targeting core labor activity, such as organizing and striking.
In the remainder of this section, I will trace the history of these lawsuits and
then describe the most recent round of civil RICO suits, focusing on
Smithfield.

26. James Gray Pope, Labor-Community Coalitions and Boycotts: The Old Labor Law,
the New Unionism, and the Living Constitution, 69 TEX. L. REV. 889, 906 (1991) (citing C.
PERRY, UNION CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS 125 (1987)) (concluding that unions’ attempts to put
direct economic pressure on employers mostly had “nuisance value,” and that “the key to
union success lies not in economic or direct pressure, but in union appeals to principle that
influence public relations”); cf. Brudney, supra note 4, at 1–2 (stating that unions engaging
in comprehensive campaigns “have enjoyed some success which in turn has contributed to a
modest rise in private sector union density, the first such increase for decades.”).
27. For example, Smithfield claimed at least $5,900,000 in damages in its complaint
against the UFCW. First Amended Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 1, at 91–92; infra Part IV.B.
According to one press release issued by Hunton & Williams, the law firm that represented
Smithfield in its civil RICO lawsuit against the UFCW, “the corporate campaign is a
coordinated, negative publicity effort intended to place unbearable financial, legal and social
pressure on a targeted employer in order to convince that employer to forego its NLRB
rights and agree to the union’s organizing demands.” Press Release, Gregory B. Robertson &
Kurt G. Larkin, Hunton & Williams LLP, RICO: A New Tool for Employers Facing Union
Corporate Campaigns? (May 2009), available at http://www.hunton.com/files/
tbl_s47Details\FileUpload265\2664\RICO_A_New_Tool_5.09.pdf.
28. Brudney, supra note 4, at 10 & n.38.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2006) (defining racketeering activity).
30. Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 409 (2003) (quoting United
States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 290 (1969)); see James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 222
n.2 (2007) (noting that the Court adopted that definition because the RICO statute leaves
extortion undefined). This is the definition of extortion under the Hobbs Act. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951(b)(2); see also United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 397 (1973).
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1. Extortion Liability for Core Union Activity
The theory that core union activity, like strikes and boycotts, constitutes
criminal conspiracy is not new; prosecutions of workers engaged in
collective action date back to at least 1806. 31 Since then, employers’ legal
theories have evolved alongside Congress’s and the courts’ modification of
the applicable law, but the underlying legal theory—that labor unions have
no right to damage an employer’s profitability or reputation through
collective action, particularly through appeals to the general public—has
remained remarkably similar.32
Early conspiracy lawsuits against unions often successfully invoked
federal antitrust law, and these suits continued even after Congress
attempted to exempt core union activity from the reach of antitrust law in
the Clayton Act. 33 In Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering 34 and later
cases, the Lochner-era Court reasoned that, through activities like picketing
and secondary boycotts, unions sought to drag third parties “against [their]
will into a concerted plan to inflict damage upon another employer who is
in dispute with his employees.” 35 That reasoning was not limited to
secondary boycotts: any labor protest could be tortious if its effect was to
embarrass potential customers away from the business with which the union
had a dispute. For example, in Truax v. Corrigan, 36 the Court overturned
31. Jim Hawkins, Papers, Petitions, and Parades: Free Expression’s Pivotal Function
in the Early Labor Movement, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 63, 68 (2007). Before the
1800s, criminal labor prosecutions were relatively rare and convictions even more unusual.
See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 61
(1991) (“[T]here seem to have been relatively few criminal conspiracy trials of trade
unionists until the 1870s . . . . In the 1870s and 1880s, however, sanctions grew harsher.”).
32. E.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 466 (1921); Loewe v.
Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 301 (1908). In Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, the Court
concluded that the Clayton Act’s labor exemption did not exempt from antitrust liability a
union’s threats of secondary boycotts and strikes—or the coerced participation of union
members in those activities—aimed at pressuring employers to adopt union wage and hour
scales. Duplex Printing Press Co., 254 U.S. at 466. The Court stated that, by expanding the
locus of the dispute beyond unionized employers, the union had “depart[ed] from its normal
and legitimate objects,” id. at 469, and instead engaged in “a general class war,” id. at 472.
Unsurprisingly, the Court theorized that “business . . . is a property right, entitled to
protection against unlawful injury or interference” by labor unions. Id. at 465. However, in
dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that the Clayton Act authorized “industrial combatants” to
“push their struggle to the limits of the justification of self interest.” Id. at 484, 488
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council,
257 U.S. 184, 204 (1921) (concluding that the Clayton Act does not protect coercion or
intimidation, from which “the person sought to be influenced has a right to be free and his
employer has a right to have him free”); FORBATH, supra note 31, at 60 (stating that, “[b]y
the early twentieth century, common law and antitrust doctrine condemned . . . virtually the
entire spectrum of peaceful secondary actions”).
33. Seth Kupferberg, Political Strikes, Labor Law, and Democratic Rights, 71 VA. L.
REV. 685, 713 (1985).
34. 254 U.S. 443.
35. Duplex Printing Press Co., 254 U.S. at 474; see also Am. Steel Foundries, 257 U.S.
at 212 (characterizing the Duplex Printing Press Co. boycott as an attempt by the union “to
use the right of trade of persons having nothing to do with the controversy . . . to injure the
Duplex Company in its interstate trade”).
36. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
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an Arizona statute protecting labor strikes and boycotts, holding that it
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 37 The Court explained that labor
picketing that forced customers patronizing the struck restaurant to “run the
gauntlet of most uncomfortable publicity, aggressive and annoying
importunity, libelous attacks and fear of injurious consequences, illegally
inflicted, to his reputation and standing in the community” was “moral
coercion,” before adding that “[v]iolence could not have been more
effective.” 38
These cases were far from isolated. “Between 1880 and 1931, by one
count, nearly two thousand injunctions were issued prohibiting strikes and
labor boycotts.” 39 They declined only after Congress passed the NorrisLaGuardia Act, which “deprived federal courts of jurisdiction to issue
injunctions in most cases arising from labor disputes.” 40 However, NorrisLaGuardia did not spell the end of lawsuits alleging that labor organizing
activity was extortionate. In 1973, the Court addressed such a suit in the
context of the Hobbs Act. In United States v. Enmons, 41 the federal
government charged that a union’s acts of violence and property destruction
constituted extortion under the Hobbs Act because they were aimed at
compelling an employer to sign a collective bargaining agreement. 42 It was
undisputed that the union’s objectives—higher wages—and the
accompanying strike were both legal, but the government argued that the
union’s use of violence amounted to extortion because it sought to obtain
“property . . . by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence or
fear.” 43 The Court rejected the government’s construction of the Hobbs Act
because it would have elevated picket-line violence to a federal racketeering
violation. 44 Instead, the Court held that a statutory violation exists only
where force, violence, or fear is used to obtain property to which “the
alleged extortionist has no lawful claim.” 45
Thus, civil RICO is simply the latest legal theory under which labor
unions have faced potential liability for organizing and related activity. As
discussed in the next section, these RICO cases have met with mixed
results, and it is unclear whether they will ultimately prove successful.

37. Id. at 340–41.
38. Id. at 328.
39. FONER, supra note 21, at 123.
40. Kupferberg, supra note 33, at 713; see also United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S.
219, 231–33 (1941) (describing how newly-enacted Norris-LaGuardia Act accomplished
what Congress first sought to accomplish through the Clayton Act and holding that its antiinjunction provisions precluded criminal liability for picketing and boycott activity).
41. 410 U.S. 396 (1973).
42. Id. at 397.
43. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2006)).
44. Id. at 411.
45. Id. at 400.
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2. Recent RICO Lawsuits Targeting Unions
A growing number of employers have responded to union comprehensive
campaigns by filing civil lawsuits based on RICO. 46 For example, in rapid
succession between October 2007 and March 2008, Smithfield Foods,
Wackenhut Corporation, and Cintas Corporation each filed a lengthy civil
complaint alleging that a union (or, in the case of Cintas, two unions), along
with other assorted labor organizations and individuals, had violated civil
RICO and other causes of action by engaging in a comprehensive
campaign. 47 None of those complaints alleged that union violence had
taken place during campaign activities. Rather, each alleged that the
defendants had committed extortion by threatening to continue the
comprehensive campaign until the employer agreed to the union’s
demands. 48
Smithfield Foods’ recent lawsuit against the UFCW is illustrative
because it both describes a comprehensive campaign that involved the
tactics discussed above and resulted in a late-stage settlement, rather than a
dismissal by a court. However, it also presents a somewhat more
complicated case because unlike many other similar lawsuits, such as
Wackenhut Corp. v. Service Employees International Union49 and Cintas
Corp. v. UNITE Here, 50 Smithfield alleged that the union goal was, at least
in part, to compel Smithfield to behave illegally. 51 To provide context, I
will discuss briefly the UFCW’s comprehensive campaign and the resulting
lawsuit.
3. The UFCW’s Comprehensive Campaign To Organize Smithfield’s Tar
Heel Plant
The Smithfield civil RICO lawsuit had its genesis more than twelve years
earlier, when the UFCW began trying to organize Smithfield’s pork
processing plant in Tar Heel, North Carolina. Tar Heel, population sixtyseven, is in southeastern North Carolina, the state with the lowest union
density in the country. 52 The Smithfield plant is the largest pork processing
plant in the world, employing about 5,000 workers who slaughter and
process 32,000 hogs per day. 53

46. Pub. L. No. 91-452, Title IX, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–
1968); see Brudney, supra note 4, at 27 nn.131–33 (listing cases).
47. See supra note 4.
48. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 43, at 12.
49. 593 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
50. 601 F. Supp. 2d 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
51. See supra note 6.
52. Tar Heel, North Carolina, CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/city/Tar-HeelNorth-Carolina.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2011); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note
19 (North Carolina’s union membership rate is 3.5%).
53. First Amended Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 9, at 3; Smithfield Tar Heel Plant Votes
for
Union,
REUTERS
(Dec.
12,
2008),
http://www.reuters.com/
article/idUSN1139559220081212;.
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The UFCW’s early organizing attempts—which did not involve a
comprehensive campaign—resulted in NLRB-monitored union elections in
1994 and 1997. 54 The UFCW lost both elections, but only after Smithfield
engaged in what the NLRB later found to have been an array of unfair labor
practices during the time leading up to each election, including threatening
employees with plant closure, threatening pro-union employees with
discipline, interrogating employees about their attitudes toward the union,
maintaining surveillance of employees distributing pro-union handbills,
suspending and firing pro-union employees, and assaulting and arresting at
least one pro-union employee. 55 Following post-election unfair labor
practice proceedings, the NLRB ordered Smithfield to reinstate with
backpay those employees who had been wrongfully fired, issued a ceaseand-desist order, required Smithfield to provide UFCW with a list of names
and addresses of current employees, and ordered Smithfield to post
notices. 56 However, the NLRB declined to issue a bargaining order, which
would have compelled Smithfield to bargain with the UFCW without
another election. 57 Moreover, Smithfield’s appeal of the NLRB’s decision
was not completed until 2006—meaning that the Board-ordered remedies
were not implemented until nearly a dozen years after the first election.58
Following the two unsuccessful NLRB elections, the UFCW changed
tactics. While maintaining a presence in Tar Heel,59 the UFCW launched a
comprehensive campaign. Consistent with comprehensive campaigns more
generally, the UFCW took its campaign to cities around the country and
broadened its focus. It also partnered with groups dedicated to labor, civil
rights, and environmental issues, as well as religious groups. Thus,
Smithfield alleged that the UFCW “invest[ed] substantial resources towards
events, actions and conduct that ha[s] little to no direct relation to the
wages, hours, benefits and working conditions of the employees.” 60 More

54. Smithfield Packing Co., Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. 1, 1 (2004).
55. Id. at 7.
56. Id. at 15–16.
57. Id. Courts may issue a “bargaining order” requiring an employer to recognize a
union as the representative of the relevant bargaining unit when the “employer has
committed independent unfair labor practices which have made the holding of a fair election
unlikely or which have in fact undermined a union’s majority and caused an election to be
set aside.” NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610 (1969).
58. See generally United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 204 v. NLRB, 447
F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
59. For example, the UFCW ran a “workers center” to help employees living and
working in eastern North Carolina with workers’ compensation, immigration, and other
problems, and to attempt to maintain a union presence and workers’ support in the area. Bob
Geary, A Fast-Moving Line and a Union Trying To Keep Up, INDEP. WKLY. (Apr. 4, 2007),
http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/a-fast-moving-line-and-a-union-trying-to-keepup/Content?oid=1201323 (describing UFCW’s role in running workers center); see also
Yonat Shimron & Barbara Barrett, Bill’s Death Stings Illegal Immigrants, NEWS &
OBSERVER,
June
9,
2007,
at
A12,
available
at
http://www.newsobserver.com/2007/06/09/35478/bills-death-stings-illegal-immigrants.html
#storylink=misearch.
60. First Amended Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 39, at 11.

2628

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

specifically, according to Smithfield, the campaign involved the
following: 61
1. Making unflattering (and according to Smithfield, untrue)
statements, such as that Smithfield was a “racist, anti-immigrant company
that feels they can terrorize workers at will,” 62 and distributing flyers and
handbills criticizing the company, for example by stating that “There’s
Blood on Smithfield Products” or that Smithfield mistreats workers in
various ways; 63
2. Publishing and distributing a report titled “Packaged With Abuse:
Safety and Health Conditions and Smithfield Packing’s Tar Heel Plant,”
which criticized the Tar Heel plant’s safety record; 64
3. Holding protests at grocery stores selling Smithfield products, some
of which stopped carrying Smithfield products; 65
4. Attributing events to religious, civil rights, immigrant rights, and
consumer advocacy groups to conceal the union’s orchestration of the
comprehensive campaign; 66
5. Leading a protest during which participants marched to the home of
the president of a store that sold Smithfield products to deliver a large
father’s day card, which was signed by the children of Smithfield workers
and stated that Smithfield workers were abused and mistreated; 67
6. Threatening a secondary boycott of stores carrying Smithfield
products; 68
7. Attempting to convince Smithfield spokesperson Paula Deen to end
her relationship with Smithfield; 69
8. Encouraging religious bodies and city councils to boycott Smithfield
or to pass resolutions condemning the company; 70
9. Sending letters criticizing the company to financial analysts; 71
10. Protesting at Smithfield’s annual shareholders’ meetings; 72 and

61. The UFCW’s comprehensive campaign against Smithfield was similar to other
comprehensive campaigns that were the subject of contemporaneous lawsuits. See, e.g.,
Cintas Corp. v. UNITE HERE, 601 F. Supp. 2d 571, 575 (S.D.N.Y.) (describing campaign,
which included claims that the union falsely portrayed company as having engaged in racist,
sexist and illegal acts, and targeted company’s customers to encourage them to stop doing
business with the company), aff’d, 355 F. App’x 508 (2d Cir. 2009); Wackenhut Corp. v.
Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1290 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (describing SEIU
campaign against Wackenhut, including publishing “false and misleading reports
disparaging Wackenhut and some of its national customers,” persuading Wackenhut
customers to boycott the company, and other activities).
62. E.g., First Amended Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 74, at 23.
63. Id. ¶ 99, at 29–30.
64. Id. ¶¶ 88–95, at 25–28.
65. Id. ¶¶ 122–24, at 37–38.
66. Id. ¶ 100, at 30.
67. Id. ¶¶ 113–15, at 34–35.
68. Id. ¶¶ 125–27, at 38–40.
69. Id. ¶¶ 131–40, at 41–44.
70. Id. ¶¶ 141–54, at 45–50.
71. Id. ¶¶ 155–58, at 50–51.
72. Id. ¶¶ 159–67, at 51–54.
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11. Filing regulatory complaints and opposing Smithfield’s regulatory
applications, such as Smithfield’s application for a water permit, which
would have allowed Smithfield to expand operations at the Tar Heel
plant. 73
4. Smithfield’s Extortion Allegation
According to Smithfield, the UFCW’s goal was to force Smithfield to
voluntarily recognize the union as the bargaining unit’s representative,
whether or not a majority of Smithfield employees wanted the
representation. 74 An employer that recognizes a union as the exclusive
representative of a bargaining unit violates the NLRA if the union does not
enjoy majority support within the unit. 75 Thus, according to Smithfield, the
extortionate threat was that UFCW would continue the comprehensive
campaign until the company agreed to an illegal election process.76 In
other words, the gravamen of Smithfield’s complaint was that the UFCW
had attempted to extort Smithfield into illegally recognizing the union by
saying untrue and embarrassing things about Smithfield that threatened to
harm Smithfield’s reputation and bottom line.
However, Smithfield apparently did not consider it necessary to show
that the union sought to compel the company to commit an illegal act in
order to establish the extortion predicate for civil RICO. Rather, Smithfield
argued that the union’s comprehensive campaign was extortionate even if
its goal was only to secure Smithfield’s neutrality regarding the prospect of
unionization or to obtain a “card-check” election 77—both agreements into
which Smithfield could have entered perfectly legally. 78 Thus, Smithfield
73. Id. ¶¶ 168–72, 179–80, at 54–56, 58–59.
74. Id. ¶ 2, at 1 (“Defendants conspired to extort Smithfield’s ‘voluntary’ recognition of
Defendants UFCW and Local 400 as the exclusive bargaining representatives of hourly
employees at Tar Heel—regardless of the degree of actual employee support for such
representation—by injuring Smithfield economically until Smithfield either agreed to
Defendants’ demands or was run out of business.”).
75. Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 738–39 (1961)
(holding that it is an unfair labor practice to recognize a minority union as the exclusive
representative, even if the employer has a good faith belief that the union actually enjoys
majority support); see also Kenrich Petrochemicals, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 910, 911 (1964)
(holding that union and employer committed unfair labor practices when the company
recognized the union as the majority representative of its employees despite both parties’
knowledge that the union did not represent a majority of employees in the appropriate unit).
76. First Amended Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 238, at 80 (alleging that, some two years
after the comprehensive campaign began, the UFCW demanded a “sham ‘election,’” among
other possibilities).
77. Id. ¶ 240 (alleging that UFCW offered to stop its comprehensive campaign if
Smithfield agreed to take legal actions such as “sit[ting] idly by while allowing Defendants
to accost the Tar Heel employees to sign cards authorizing [UFCW] to represent them for
purposes of collective bargaining”); Transcript of Hearing at 58, Smithfield Food, Inc. v.
United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 585 F. Supp. 2d 789 (E.D. Va. 2008) (No.
3:07CV641) (Smithfield attorney stating that “extorting neutrality is just as unlawful as
extorting a [sham] election. It’s a way they can guarantee they’ll win.”).
78. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 597–98 (1969) (holding card-check
election is lawful means of ascertaining whether union has support of majority of employees
in bargaining unit); Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law Reform and Pre-
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also alleged that the UFCW conveyed extortionate threats when, for
example, a UFCW contractor stated at a protest that “Smithfield is not
listening, so we’re going to have to go after their pocketbook.”79 Likewise,
the plaintiffs in the Wackenhut and Cintas cases alleged extortion based on
comprehensive campaigns that sought to pressure employers into agreeing
to legal card-check or neutrality agreements.80
This theory may sound implausible because the notion that activities like
peaceful protesting and lobbying can give rise to a charge of extortion is, to
say the least, counterintuitive. In that regard, Professor Rick Bales mused
that the Smithfield lawsuit seemed so implausible that the suit itself might
give rise to company liability for an unfair labor practice.81 In this vein, a
few arguments that the union’s activity simply does not meet the statutory
requirements are readily apparent. For example, in Enmons, the Supreme
Court construed statutory language identical to that contained in the civil
RICO statute, and held that union activity—even when accompanied by
violence—could not give rise to extortion liability, provided the union’s
objective was legitimate.82
Yet, none of these arguments prevailed in Smithfield. Instead, the court
held at the motion to dismiss stage that Enmons did not control because it
Recognition Labor Neutrality Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 374–77 (2001) (describing pervasive use of neutrality
agreements).
79. First Amended Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 106, at 32.
80. Cintas Corp. v. UNITE HERE, 601 F. Supp. 2d 571, 575 (S.D.N.Y.) (stating that
unions sought “card-check/neutrality agreement”), aff’d, 355 F. App’x 508 (2d Cir. 2009);
Wackenhut Corp. v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1296 (S.D. Fla. 2009)
(stating that Wackenhut “asserts that SEIU is attempting to ‘bend its will’ and obtain from it
various intangible property rights, including Wackenhut’s right to control the form and
nature of the union recognition process that applies to its employees; Wackenhut’s right to
refuse demands for recognition from a ‘mixed union’ such as SEIU; Wackenhut’s right to
decline collective bargaining with SEIU; Wackenhut’s right to preserve its employees’
statutory right to ‘free choice,’ and Wackenhut’s right to conduct business with its customers
free from interference, harassment and threats of economic doom from SEIU or its agents”).
81. Richard Bates, NYT on Smithfield’s RICO Suit v. UFCW, WORKPLACE PROF BLOG
(Feb.
5,
2008),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2008/02/nyt-onsmithfie.html (referencing Smithfield lawsuit and noting “the changes to the Board’s policies
on when filing a frivolous suit might (or might not as the case may be) constitute a ULP”);
see also Adam Liptak, A Corporate View of Mafia Tactics: Protesting, Lobbying and Citing
Upton Sinclair, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2008, at A14, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/05/us/05bar.html (opining that “what [Smithfield’s
attorney] calls extortion sounds quite a bit like free speech”).
82. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 404 (1973). Further, it is not at all clear that
employer-plaintiffs can satisfy “generic” extortion’s other requirements, including the
mandates that any extortion result in obtaining property or that the use of force, fear, or
threats be “wrongful.” See Cintas Corp, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 577–78 (comprehensive
campaign not extortionate because company does not have a right to operate free from
criticism); Brudney, supra note 4, § III.A. There are other reasons that civil RICO suits
might fail. For example, they may be preempted under San Diego Building Trades Council,
Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (holding that activity that is arguably
encompassed within Sections 7 or 8 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) can be
regulated only by the NLRB, and that, even if the NLRB declines jurisdiction, the conduct is
not redressable in state court unless it was a traditional tort or conduct marked by violence
and imminent threats to public order).
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construed only federal law, whereas civil RICO lawsuits can rely on state
extortion law. 83 It then went on to reject each of the union’s other
arguments based on the civil RICO act’s statutory language, labor
preemption, and the First Amendment. (Other courts have rejected labor
unions’ Enmons arguments on other grounds, arguing that Enmons either is
limited essentially to its facts and applies only to incidents of violence
occurring during a strike,84 or applies only when labor unions are seeking
traditional collective bargaining goals such as increased wages.85)
Ultimately, the Smithfield suit also survived a motion for summary
judgment and ended in settlement on the eve of trial. 86
In contrast, Wackenhut and Cintas were dismissed pursuant to Federal
Rule 12(b)(6) under different legal theories. 87 The mixed track record of
the Smithfield, Wackenhut, and Cintas suits is representative of civil RICO
cases targeting comprehensive campaigns generally. 88 Thus, given the
chance that an employer will survive a motion to dismiss, and the prospect
of a favorable settlement, civil RICO suits are likely to continue. Further,
the costs associated with defending a civil RICO suit and the prospect of
losing such a suit and facing liability for treble damages and attorneys’ fees
(even if the prospect is small) is likely to deter unions from waging
comprehensive campaigns. As the D.C. Circuit stated in the course of
rejecting a civil RICO suit, they are “a potentially powerful weapon to
wield against striking workers” that could “reset the labor-management
balance.” 89

83. Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 585 F.
Supp. 2d 789, 800–01 (E.D. Va. 2008); see also Herbert R. Northrup & Charles H. Steen,
Union “Corporate Campaigns” as Blackmail: The RICO Battle at Bayou Steel, 22 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 771, 813 (1998) (arguing that Enmons does not apply to state law).
84. See, e.g., Tex. Air Corp. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l, No. 88-0804, 1989 WL
146414, at *6 (S.D. Fla. July 14, 1989) (noting that “[n]umerous courts have effectively
limited Enmons to its facts, creating an exception to the Hobbs Act only for what was at
issue in that case—violence committed during the course of a lawful strike called for the
purpose of inducing an employer’s agreement to legitimate collective-bargaining demands”
and citing cases).
85. See, e.g., id. (stating that “[i]n other contexts, the Supreme Court has made clear that
to constitute ‘legitimate labor objectives,’ the goal defendants were seeking to accomplish
must have been ‘intimately related to wages, hours and working conditions.’” (quoting Local
Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689–90
(1965))).
86. Smithfield Foods, United Food and Commercial Workers Reach Settlement,
TRIANGLE
BUS.
J.
(Oct.
27,
2008),
http://www.bizjournals.com/triangle/
stories/2008/10/27/daily8.html.
87. Cintas Corp., 601 F. Supp. 2d at 577–78 (dismissing case after concluding that
comprehensive campaign was “lawful ‘hard-bargaining’” because Cintas would have
received some benefit from a card-check/neutrality agreement); Wackenhut Corp. v. Serv.
Emps. Int’l Union, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1296 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (dismissing case after
concluding that union had not sought to “obtain” property as required to establish extortion
as a RICO predicate).
88. Brudney, supra note 4, at 27 & n.134 (listing cases and stating that “motions [to
dismiss] succeed or fail at roughly comparable levels”).
89. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers Local Union 639, 913 F.2d 948, 955 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
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In sum, it is unclear under current law whether civil RICO liability can
attach to comprehensive campaign activity. Moreover, even if civil RICO
suits charging labor unions with extortion are ultimately determined to be
legally untenable, they could be eclipsed by some other cause of action—
for example, Smithfield pressed a variety of tort theories, which also
survived a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. If there
is a basis on which to find that labor unions’ advocacy enjoys robust
constitutional protection, however, then whether labor speech violates civil
RICO or another statute will become largely irrelevant because “the point
of modern First Amendment law is that speech is often protected even
though it violates a law restricting it.”90 Thus, the remainder of this Article
addresses whether comprehensive campaigns, even if otherwise subject to
civil RICO liability, might nonetheless be protected by the First
Amendment.
In the next section, I survey the evolution of the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on labor picketing, boycotting, and petitioning activity,
focusing on the difficulty of reconciling the Court’s labor speech cases with
First Amendment cases involving other speakers.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR UNION COMPREHENSIVE
CAMPAIGN SPEECH UNDER CURRENT LAW
Though the Supreme Court has tended to interpret the First Amendment
in an increasingly speech-protective way since the 1920s, there have also
been cycles of contracting free speech rights, as well as a fair amount of
ambiguity in its First Amendment jurisprudence. 91 Even given that lack of
clarity, labor speech occupies a relatively uncertain place in the hierarchy of
First Amendment protection. At times, labor speech has driven an
expansion of free speech rights; for example, it was in a labor case,
Thornhill v. Alabama, 92 that the Court first found a First Amendment right
to picket. But after a period of expansion in the late 1930s and early 1940s,
labor speech rights contracted as the Court narrowed or eviscerated its
earlier precedents. Now, while cases like Thornhill remain good law as
applied to speech by other social movements, they are essentially
inapplicable to labor speech. The net result is that labor speech is its own
category under current First Amendment doctrine, entitled to less protection
than that received by both other social movements and commercial entities.
Specifically, the Court has allowed greater restrictions on the types of
labor expression commonly found in comprehensive campaigns—such as
90. Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of
Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV.
1277, 1315 (2005); see also Nat’l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 264 (1994)
(Souter, J., concurring) (noting that conduct that might otherwise be the basis for a civil
RICO suit might “be fully protected First Amendment activity”).
91. See generally Ken I. Kersch, How Conduct Became Speech and Speech Became
Conduct: A Political Development Case Study in Labor Law and the Freedom of Speech, 8
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 255 (2006).
92. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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boycotts, picketing, and petitioning activity93—than it has allowed in the
civil rights context. At the same time, the Court’s description of, and
justification for, its commercial speech doctrine does not neatly apply to
labor speech. Moreover, the Court has not advanced a unified theory of its
treatment of labor-related expression. 94 Collectively, the Court’s placement
of union speech within the First Amendment hierarchy provides at least
some support for the argument that a union’s expressive activity can be
punished as extortionate without violating the First Amendment.
A. Picketing
As discussed above, until Congress intervened by passing the NorrisLaGuardia Act, courts routinely held that labor union picketing infringed
employers’ property rights, regularly imposing injunctions or criminal
penalties. 95 During that period, the Court viewed picketing as tantamount
to violence, essentially unrelated to speech: “the name ‘picket’ indicate[s] a
militant purpose, inconsistent with peaceable persuasion.” 96
That began to change in the 1930s. First, the Court upheld a state statute
that expressly allowed peaceful picketing against an employer’s Fourteenth
Amendment challenge. 97 Then in Thornhill, the Court took a dramatic step
toward broader protection for labor speech by overturning, on First
Amendment grounds, the criminal conviction of a picketing striker.
Thornhill held that labor speech deserved robust protection based on a
truth-seeking theory of the First Amendment: “Those who won our
independence had confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning
and communication of ideas to discover and spread political and economic
truth.” 98 Significantly, the Court also directly linked “traditional” labor
objectives to the political debates of the day:
It is recognized now that satisfactory hours and wages and working
conditions in industry and a bargaining position which makes these
possible have an importance which is not less than the interests of those in
93. See, e.g., James Gray Pope, Labor and the Constitution: From Abolition to
Deindustrialization, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1071, 1073 (1987) (arguing that rule established in
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964), would be an impermissible
content-based prior restraint in any other context). See generally Alan Hyde, Exclusion Is
Forever: How Keeping Rights To Strike, Picket, and Other Labour Speech, Separate from
Constitutional Rights, Has Proven a Bad Deal for American Labour Unions and
Constitutional Law 3 (Rutgers Sch. of Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 057, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1517844 (noting that the Supreme Court has “upheld
severe limitations on the content or message of union speech, picketing, and boycotts,
limitations that could not constitutionally be applied to the same conduct carried out by
groups other than labour groups”). Cf. Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 590 v. Logan
Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (holding that peaceful labor picketing, absent an
impermissible purpose or manner, is protected by the First Amendment).
94. Pope, supra note 93, at 1082 (noting that the courts have “declined to develop a
unified doctrine of labor liberty” and instead rely on a hodgepodge of doctrines, including
those pertaining to commercial rights and speech rights).
95. See supra Part I.B.1.
96. Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 205 (1921).
97. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, Local No. 5, 301 U.S. 468, 478–80 (1937).
98. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940).
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the business or industry directly concerned. The health of the present
generation and of those as yet unborn may depend on these matters, and
the practices in a single factory may have economic repercussions upon a
whole region and affect widespread systems of marketing. . . . Free
discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor
disputes appears to us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of
the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern
industrial society. The issues raised by regulations, such as are
challenged here, infringing upon the right of employees effectively to
inform the public of the facts of a labor dispute are part of this larger
problem. 99

Thus, in the Court’s view, labor unions were more than just a collection of
workers out to improve their own economic situations; to the contrary, they
had broader social relevance.
But the Court soon began to chip away at Thornhill’s broad holding. The
following year, the Court held in Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago,
Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc. 100 that picketing could be enjoined
wholesale once non-trivial violence had taken place on the picket line—and
that the resulting injunction need not be narrowly targeted at stopping the
violence. 101 One year after that, in Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v.
Wohl, 102 the Court suggested in dictum that even nonviolent picketing
might permissibly be enjoined if it was “coerci[ve]” or “excessive.”103
As foreshadowed in Wohl, the Court soon upheld an injunction against
peaceful picketing because, in the Court’s view, the purpose of the
picketing was to compel an employer to violate the law.104 Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co. involved a labor dispute between a local affiliate
of the Ice and Coal Drivers and Handlers union and some nonunion ice
peddlers. 105 To pressure the peddlers to join the union, the union sought to
convince ice wholesalers to stop supplying the peddlers—even though it
would have been an antitrust violation for the wholesalers to do so.106
Empire, one of the wholesalers, refused to participate in the union’s plan,
and the union responded by peacefully picketing with signs that truthfully
stated that Empire sold ice to nonunion peddlers.107 In response, eightyfive percent of the truck drivers who delivered to or from Empire honored
the picket line and refused to do business with Empire, reducing Empire’s

99. Id. at 103.
100. 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
101. Id. at 294–95. But cf. Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 325–26 (1941)
(overturning on First Amendment grounds injunction against picketing that had been entirely
peaceful).
102. 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
103. Id. at 775 (striking down injunction of peaceful picket in part because there was no
other avenue for the picketers to convey their message, but suggesting that states could limit
peaceful picketing under other circumstances).
104. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 504 (1949).
105. Id. at 492.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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business by a corresponding amount. 108 The Court held that the
effectiveness of the picket placed Empire in an untenable situation—absent
court intervention, its only options were to commit illegal activity or go out
of business. 109
The Giboney Court easily rejected the union’s First Amendment defense,
first stating the general principle that antitrust laws do not violate the First
Amendment, even when antitrust conspiracies are formed through
speech. 110 The Court added that the picketing—even if both peaceful and
truthful—could not be separated from the union’s “single and integrated
course of conduct,” which included “their powerful transportation
combination, their patrolling, their formation of a picket line warning union
men not to cross at peril of their union membership, [and] their
publicizing,” which was aimed at “compel[ling] Empire” to stop selling to
the nonunion peddlers. 111 Concluding that picketing “may include conduct
other than speech,” the Court held that the union’s expressive conduct could
be restrained because its “sole, unlawful immediate objective was to induce
Empire to violate the Missouri law.” 112
Following Giboney, the Court repeatedly upheld restrictions on labor
picketing, reasoning that even though picketing has a speech component, it
also involves conduct, to which the First Amendment does not apply.113
Thus, the Court stated, “picketing, even though ‘peaceful,’ involved more
than just the communication of ideas” because “the very presence of a
picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of
the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated.” 114
Significantly, the Court expanded the application of that principle to
cases in which the picketing involved neither unlawful means nor ends, but
merely contravened state policy. For example, in Hughes v. Superior
Court, 115 the Court upheld an injunction against picketing that supported a
group’s demand for racially proportional employment—even though it

108. Id. at 493.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 495–96.
111. Id. at 498.
112. Id. at 501–02.
113. E.g., Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951)
(permitting injunction against secondary picketing because picketing was tantamount to
conduct aimed at accomplishing an unlawful end); Bldg. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 262
v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 536–37 (1950) (holding that, while picketing is in part an exercise
of free speech, it is “more than speech and establishes a locus in quo that has far more
potential for inducing action or nonaction than the message the pickets convey”); Hughes v.
Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464–65, 469 (1950) (stating that labor picketing is more than
free speech and upholding injunction); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Union, Local 309 v. Hanke,
339 U.S. 470, 474, 480–81 (1950) (upholding injunction and reasoning that one ingredient of
picketing is communication, but picketing does not receive full First Amendment
protection).
114. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 289 (1957) (quoting
Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942)).
115. 339 U.S. 460.
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would not have been illegal for the picketed employer to accede to the
picketers’ demand. 116
Thus, by 1950, states could—without violating the First Amendment—
enjoin peaceful and truthful picketing whenever it violated state policy
because picketing was part conduct, and coercive conduct at that.
Unsurprisingly then, the Court soon acknowledged that Thornhill’s
application had been sharply circumscribed. 117 Supplanting Thornhill was
a focus on coercion. The potentially coercive effects of picketing were
twofold. First, as to union sympathizers, even entirely peaceful pickets
could function primarily as a “signal” calling for an “automatic
response.” 118 Second, as to everybody else, the picket line would induce
compliance out of fear or intimidation, rather than genuine persuasion. 119
Thus, in First Amendment picketing cases, the Court has focused on
whether the picketing had the potential to draw others into labor disputes
for reasons unrelated to their independent belief in the union’s cause. For
example, in deciding when the NLRB could regulate secondary picketing,
the Court distinguished cases in which the picketing was likely to be so
detrimental to the secondary employer’s business that the employer would
feel compelled to cooperate with the union in the primary labor dispute
(rather than withstand further picketing) from cases in which the picketing
would be at most a mere inconvenience to the secondary employer.120
Likewise, the Court has consistently held that handbilling is not coercive
and therefore receives substantial First Amendment protection. 121
Labor picketing has undoubtedly become less capable of coercion as
union density has fallen over time. Thus, in earlier cases like International
116. Id. at 468 (stating that even though “a State chooses to enjoin picketing to secure
submission to a demand for employment proportional to the racial origin of the then
customers of a business, it need not forbid the employer to adopt such a quota system of his
own free will”).
117. Vogt, 354 U.S. at 291 (stating that Giboney was a “decisive reconsideration” of
Thornhill).
118. NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the result).
119. E.g., NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 82–83 (1964)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Because of the very nature of picketing there may be numbers of
persons who will refuse to buy at all from a picketed store, either out of economic or social
conviction or because they prefer to shop where they need not brave a picket line.”).
120. Compare id. at 72–73 (majority opinion) (holding that NLRB lacked statutory
authority to regulate picketing at supermarket because the picketing only asked consumers
not to purchase a particular type of apple, which was unlikely to cause the supermarket to
suffer a decline in sales and, therefore unlikely to force the supermarket to join the union’s
fight against the apple growers), with Retail Stores Emps. Union, 447 U.S. at 614–16
(holding that NLRB could regulate secondary picketing consistent with the NLRA and the
First Amendment because the secondary employer’s primary source of income was derived
from selling the picketed product).
121. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 580 (1988) (holding as a matter of constitutional avoidance that NLRA does not
prohibit secondary handbilling and stating that picketing is “‘qualitatively ‘different from
other modes of communication,’’” in part because picketing was more “effective” than
handbilling and other modes of communication (quoting Babbit v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S.
289, 311 n.17 (1979) (quoting Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 465 (1950)))).
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Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB, 122 in which the
union caused unionized subcontractors to walk off a job site at which
nonunion electrical contractors were working, the union was able to
credibly threaten that the contractor would not be able to hire any skilled
tradesmen to finish the work without first hiring union electricians.123
However, given the extremely low rate of union density in most of the
country, it seems doubtful that many unions could meaningfully make a
similar threat today. Instead, most union picketing will need to rely
primarily on its intellectual or emotional persuasiveness. Yet, the Court has
not revisited the notion that labor picketing can be limited because of its
coercive character.124
Further, labor picketing receives less protection than other picketing.
The Court’s conclusion that labor picketing is only part speech because of
its coercive nature has not translated to other types of picketing. Thus, in
cases involving picketing by other social movements, the Supreme Court
has afforded top-tier First Amendment protection, upholding bans on
picketing only where they were narrowly tailored to achieve compelling
state interests. 125 The reason for this distinction is unclear, though the
Court has suggested that it is not because other types of picketing are
somehow less coercive, but instead because labor picketing is economic and
not of “broader social concern.” 126
Finally, the Court has never offered a basis for reconciling cases like
Giboney and Hughes, in which the Court held that picketing could be
enjoined if it sought to compel an employer to act in contravention of state
law or policy, with the Court’s cases on incitement of illegal activity.127
Specifically, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court overturned a conviction
under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute for advocating criminal
122. 341 U.S. 694 (1951).
123. Id. at 697.
124. Although it is counterintuitive, there is precedent for the notion that the amount of
First Amendment protection to which particular speech is entitled depends on the likely
responses of the listeners. E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969); cf.
Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775–76 (1942) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (“If the opinion in this case means that a State can prohibit picketing when it is
effective but may not prohibit it when it is ineffective, then I think we have made a basic
departure from [Thornhill] . . . .”).
125. E.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487–88 (1988) (upholding ban on picketing in
front of residences, which was challenged by abortion protestors, after holding that the ban
was narrowly tailored to achieve a “substantial and justifiable” interest); NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 886, 909 (1982) (picketing deployed in support of
civil rights boycott was protected by the First Amendment and received maximum First
Amendment protection).
126. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465–66 (1980) (rejecting an Illinois state statute that
permitted labor picketing more broadly than other picketing, distinguishing labor picketing
from “[p]ublic-issue picketing,” which was “‘an exercise of . . . basic constitutional rights in
their most pristine and classic form’” and of “broader social concern” (alteration in original)
(quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963))); see, e.g., Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 913 (“While States have broad power to regulate economic
activity, we do not find a comparable right to prohibit peaceful political activity . . . .”).
127. Volokh, supra note 90, at 1321–22 (arguing that Giboney is inconsistent with
Brandenburg, unless Giboney’s holding is narrowed to apply only to labor picketing).

2638

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

activity. 128 The Court held that “constitutional guarantees of free speech
and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of . . .
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.” 129 The government may punish speech inciting others to violate
the law only if three conditions are met: intent to incite lawless action,
likelihood of success, and imminence. 130 Claiborne Hardware affirmed
that standard in the civil context when it held that Charles Evers’s speeches,
which threatened violence against boycott-violators, were nonetheless
protected speech because appeals that “do not incite lawless action . . . must
be regarded as protected speech.” 131
B. Boycotts
Like picketing, labor boycotts were once deemed violations of the law
entitled to no First Amendment protection.132 Now, many boycotts and
strikes enjoy statutory protection under the NLRA, although the NLRA also
prohibits secondary boycotts and strikes by unions.133 The Court has
upheld the prohibition of secondary boycotts based on the theory that they
are coercive: they compel neutral employers to insert themselves into labor
disputes to avoid becoming the targets of union-led boycotts. 134
For example, in International Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied
International, the Court upheld an NLRB injunction ordering the
International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) to cease a secondary
boycott involving ILA’s refusal to service ships carrying Russian cargo to
express displeasure with the Soviet Union’s recent invasion of
Afghanistan. 135 The Court rejected the ILA’s First Amendment defense,
stating that “conduct designed not to communicate but to coerce merits still
128. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444–45. Brandenburg was decided after both Giboney
and Hughes, but courts have nonetheless continued to apply those cases in the labor context.
E.g., Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 585 F.
Supp. 2d 789, 803 (E.D. Va. 2008).
129. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
130. Id.; see also Steven G. Gey, The Nuremberg Files and the First Amendment Value of
Threats, 78 TEX. L. REV. 541, 547 (2000) (“Under Brandenberg, political speech can be
regulated only if the speech incites illegal action, is intended by the speaker to instigate that
action, and is uttered in a context in which the illegal action is likely to occur
immediately.”).
131. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 928; see also Gey, supra note 130, at 551–52.
132. E.g., Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 438 (1911) (holding that
courts can enjoin boycotts when “property is irreparably damaged or commerce is illegally
restrained”).
133. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (2006).
134. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982); see also
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 466 (1921) (defining secondary boycott
as a “combination not merely to refrain from dealing with complainant, or to advise or by
peaceful means persuade complainant’s customers to refrain (‘primary boycott’), but to
exercise coercive pressure upon such customers”).
135. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 456 U.S. at 224 (stating that the boycott was aimed at
“free[ing] ILA members from the morally repugnant duty of handling Russian goods” to
protest the recent invasion).
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less consideration under the First Amendment [than secondary
picketing],” 136 and observing that other avenues of communication were
available to the union and its members. 137 The Supreme Court did so
despite its explicit recognition of the inherently political nature of the ILA’s
protest and that the ILA’s members did not stand to gain financially from
their boycott. If anything, the Court held that fact against the union,
agreeing with the court of appeals’ assessment that it was “more rather than
less objectionable that a national labor union” had engaged in a secondary
boycott in support of a “‘random political objective far removed from what
has traditionally been thought to be the realm of legitimate union
activity.’” 138 Further, the Court undertook no analysis of the likelihood that
the secondary boycott would have any success in persuading the ship
owners to attempt to influence Russian policy, stating only that the union
had infringed their “rights.” 139
Yet, less than a year later, in Claiborne Hardware, the Court took the
opposite stance—holding that secondary boycotting and picketing activity
were at the core of the First Amendment—in the context of a civil rights
organization’s secondary boycott. 140 In Claiborne Hardware, the NAACP
sought to pressure local government officials to improve racial equality and
integration by, in part, boycotting white area merchants. In other words, the
NAACP launched a secondary boycott designed to compel the merchants to
pressure the government on the NAACP’s behalf. 141 In support of the
boycott, the NAACP engaged in picketing and marches and also designated
“store watchers” who were responsible for publicizing the names of
individuals who violated the boycott so that those individuals could be
socially ostracized. 142 Isolated incidents of violence also took place.143
The businesses sued, claiming the boycott violated a variety of tort and
antitrust laws. The Court held that the First Amendment protected the
NAACP’s secondary boycott and related activities, even though the conduct
was coercive, and despite the incidents of violence.144 The Court
concluded:
While States have broad power to regulate economic activity, we do
not find a comparable right to prohibit peaceful political activity such as
that found in the boycott in this case. This Court has recognized that
expression on public issues ‘has always rested on the highest rung of the
hierarchy of First Amendment values.’ 145

136. Id. at 226.
137. Id. at 227.
138. Id. at 225–26 (quoting Allied Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 640 F.2d
1368, 1378 (1st Cir. 1981)).
139. Id. at 227.
140. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 932–34 (1982).
141. Id. at 889.
142. Id. at 903–04.
143. Id. at 923.
144. Id. at 931–34.
145. Id. at 913 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).
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Thus, the Court rejected the principle that coercive expression, including
secondary boycotts, merited less First Amendment protection than noncoercive speech. 146 Further, it did so by relying on Thornhill, which it had
long since disavowed in the labor context.147
In fact, the Court specifically reaffirmed its earlier labor speech cases,
including Allied International. It distinguished those cases—which upheld
restrictions on labor picketing and boycotts based on their coercive
nature—by stating that labor speech is primarily economic, rather than
political, and may be regulated as “part of ‘Congress’ striking of the
delicate balance between union freedom of expression and the ability of
neutral employers, employees, and consumers to remain free from coerced
participation in industrial strife.’” 148 Specifically, Claiborne Hardware
stated that the NAACP’s campaign
grew out of a racial dispute with the white merchants and city government
of Port Gibson and all of the picketing, speeches, and other
communication associated with the boycott were directed to the
elimination of racial discrimination in the town. This differentiates this
case from a boycott organized for economic ends, for speech to protest
racial discrimination is essential political speech lying at the core of the
First Amendment. 149

Thus, Claiborne Hardware apparently revived only part of Thornhill,
rejecting that Court’s statement regarding the necessity of “[f]ree discussion
concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes” to
146. The Court had previously overturned a prior restraint against coercive leafleting in a
non-labor context, stating that:
The claim that the expressions were intended to exercise a coercive impact on
respondent does not remove them from the reach of the First Amendment.
Petitioners plainly intended to influence respondent’s conduct by their activities;
this is not fundamentally different from the function of a newspaper. . . . But so
long as the means are peaceful, the communication need not meet standards of
acceptability.
Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). However, Organization for a
Better Austin did not address the extent of its application to labor speech.
147. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 909; see also supra Part II.A.
148. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 912 (quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Emps.
Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 617–18 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
concurring in result)). Though Claiborne Hardware Co. distinguished between economic
and political speech in the context of “coercive” speech, it was not the first case in which the
Court expressed or implied that political speech was different from, and more important (in
First Amendment terms) than, labor speech. E.g., Carey, 447 U.S. at 467; Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762–63 & n.17 (1976)
(noting that “[t]he interests of the contestants in a labor dispute are primarily economic, but
it has long been settled that both the employee and the employer are protected by the First
Amendment when they express themselves on the merits of the dispute in order to influence
its outcome,” and referring to labor speech as “speech of an entirely private and economic
character”). Likewise, in Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor
Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941), Justice Black stated in dissent that he would have
overturned the labor injunction at issue because the speech involved public discussion of
conflicting methods of milk distribution, implicitly rejecting—as did the rest of the Court,
which upheld the injunction—the notion that discussion of working conditions deserved the
same level of First Amendment protection. Id. at 302–03 (Black, J., dissenting).
149. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 915.
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the “effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to
shape the destiny of modern industrial society.” 150 Moreover, the Court did
not confront its earlier statement in Allied International that the boycott in
that case was purely political and had no economic motive.
One additional basis for distinguishing Claiborne Hardware from Allied
International, though not one identified by the Supreme Court, is that
Claiborne Hardware involved a consumer boycott, while Allied
International involved a strike. 151 That distinction might be important if
strikes were necessarily more coercive (by which I mean effective) than
consumer boycotts. However, it is not readily apparent that that is the case,
at least not in all situations. For example, a strike that lasts for only a short
time or takes place at just one of a company’s several factories may well be
less harmful to a company than a prolonged, nationwide (or international)
consumer boycott. Further, the Supreme Court has upheld limits on
coercive consumer boycotts sponsored by labor unions. For example, in
NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001,152 the Court upheld an
injunction against a union’s call for a consumer boycott based on the
boycott’s potential to coerce the secondary employer. 153
Since deciding Claiborne Hardware, the Court has continued to hold that
boycotts arising from labor disputes do not fall under that case’s rule,
reasoning that such speech is self-interested and economically-motivated.
For example, in Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Ass’n, 154 the Federal Trade Commission brought an antitrust
action against a group of lawyers seeking to influence the District of
Columbia government to raise their compensation for representing indigent
criminal defendants.155 In support of their cause, they essentially went on
strike—though without the protections of the Norris-LaGuardia Act—by
refusing to accept any more appointments in criminal cases.156 The lawyers
argued that they were entitled to protection under Claiborne Hardware, and
that, among other things, they would not have been able to generate support
for their cause absent their public boycott. 157 The Court easily held that the
150. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103 (1940).
151. See, e.g., Michael C. Harper, The Consumer’s Emerging Right To Boycott: NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware and Its Implications for American Labor Law, 93 YALE L.J. 409,
426–27 (1984).
152. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
153. Id. at 616. In Retail Store Employees Union, a union picketed several sellers of
Safeco insurance policies in order to protest Safeco’s actions. Though the union simply
asked consumers to cancel their Safeco policies, and not to boycott the sellers entirely, the
Court nonetheless held that the union had violated the NLRA because its actions were
tantamount to asking consumers to boycott the sellers, who derived nearly all of their
business from selling Safeco policies. Id. at 614–15. The Court further rejected the union’s
First Amendment defense, holding that picketing that “predictably encourages consumers to
boycott a secondary business . . . imposes no impermissible restrictions upon constitutionally
protected speech.” Id.
154. 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
155. Id. at 414.
156. Id. at 416.
157. Id. at 420–21. There was also some evidence that the District of Columbia—the
supposed victim of the antitrust conspiracy—welcomed the boycott, which generated enough
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lawyers’ conduct in publicizing their boycott and lobbying the District of
Columbia government was protected by the First Amendment.158
However, the Court rejected the argument that the First Amendment
protected the actual boycott, distinguishing Claiborne Hardware because,
whereas “[t]hose who joined the Claiborne Hardware boycott sought no
special advantage for themselves,” the trial lawyers sought “an economic
advantage for those who agreed to participate.” 159 It also rejected the
argument that the boycott was protected speech because it was expressive
activity on a matter of public concern, noting that “[e]very concerted refusal
to do business with a potential customer or supplier has an expressive
component,” and “[p]ublicity may be generated by any other activity that is
sufficiently newsworthy.” 160
C. Petitioning
Labor petitioning activity, like picketing and boycotting, has received
varying levels of First Amendment protection at different times in the
Court’s history. However, the Court has come nearly full-circle, recently
holding as a matter of constitutional avoidance that petitioning activity,
even in the labor context, cannot be regulated in most circumstances.161
One of the first cases to find broad First Amendment protection for
petitioning activity, even if the goal of the activity was anticompetitive,
arose in the union context. In United Mine Workers of America v.
Pennington, 162 the Court held that, although it would ordinarily be an
antitrust violation for a union and an employer to collaborate to impose a
higher wage scale on a competitor, the First Amendment barred antitrust
liability when such collusion related to petitioning activity. 163 Thus, the
Court concluded that no antitrust liability attached when the United Mine
Workers and a multi-employer association jointly approached the Secretary
of Labor to set a minimum wage requirement for coal companies selling to
the government, even if the purpose of that agreement was to drive small
companies out of the market. 164
Later, in Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 165 the Court held that
the NLRB could enjoin baseless lawsuits filed to retaliate against

public support to make it politically feasible for the District government to raise the
compensation rates. Id. at 442 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
158. Id. at 426–27 (majority opinion).
159. Id. at 426. The Court also rejected the argument that the lawyers’ conduct was
entitled to additional First Amendment protection because it facilitated the Sixth
Amendment right to competent counsel. Id. at 427 n.11 (“Claiborne Hardware . . . does not
protect every boycott having a constitutional dimension.”).
160. Id. at 431. Justice Brennan, concurring, suggested that the majority had been
“insensitive to the venerable tradition of expressive boycotts.” Id. at 437 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
161. See, e.g., BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 536–37 (2002).
162. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
163. Id. at 669–70.
164. Id.
165. 461 U.S. 731 (1983).

2011]

LABOR VALUES ARE FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES

2643

employees for exercising their rights under the NLRA. 166 This holding
allowed greater regulation of lawsuits filed in the labor context than in the
commercial setting, where only “sham” lawsuits could be limited.167
However, Bill Johnson’s Restaurants was short-lived. In 2002, in BE &
K Construction Co. v. NLRB, 168 the Court addressed whether the NLRB
could “impose liability on an employer for filing a losing retaliatory
lawsuit,” even if the suit did not meet the sham exception. 169 The NLRB
argued that its actions were less of an infringement on the First Amendment
than the antitrust action in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v.
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. 170 because NLRB proceedings were
initiated by a neutral third party, were less likely to impose high discovery
costs on the defending party, and could not result in punitive remedies.171
The Court rejected this argument, concluding that “[a]t most . . . these
arguments demonstrate that the threat of an antitrust suit may pose a greater
burden on petitioning than the threat of an NLRA adjudication. This does
not mean the burdens posed by the NLRA raise no First Amendment
concerns.” 172
Reviewing the First Amendment interests served by unsuccessful
lawsuits, the Court made three points: first, some unsuccessful lawsuits
involve genuine grievances; second, unsuccessful lawsuits can advance
First Amendment interests in “‘public[ly] airing [] disputed facts,’” raising
“matters of public concern,” “promot[ing] the evolution of the law,” and
“add[ing] legitimacy to the court system as a designated alternative to
force”; and third, “while baseless suits can be seen as analogous to false
statements [which are not entitled to First Amendment protection], that
analogy does not directly extend to suits that are unsuccessful but

166. Id. at 748–49; see also infra Part IV.A.
167. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 515–16 (1972)
(holding that courts could find antitrust violation because filing anti-competitive lawsuits
with the alleged goal of limiting competitor’s access to administrative and judicial tribunals
fell under the “sham” exception). “Sham” lawsuits are both “objectively baseless in the
sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits” and
motivated by “‘an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor’”; they are not entitled to First Amendment protection. BE & K Constr. Co. v.
NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 526 (2002) (quoting Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60–61 (1993)).
168. 536 U.S. 516.
169. Id. at 524.
170. 508 U.S. 49.
171. BE & K Constr. Co., 536 U.S. at 528–29.
172. Id. at 529. Justice Breyer, concurring, rejected this conclusion, pointing out that
antitrust law threatens “treble damages,” whereas the NLRB could at most force one side to
pay the other’s attorneys’ fees. Id. at 541 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer also
pointed out that “the NLRA finds in the need to regulate an employer’s antiunion lawsuits
much of its historical reason for being. Throughout the 19th century, courts had upheld
prosecutions of unions as criminal conspiracies. . . . And in the process [the courts] had
reinterpreted federal statutes that Congress had not intended for use against the organizing
activities of labor unions.” Id. at 542 (citations omitted). Thus, Justice Breyer concluded that
“an employer’s antiunion lawsuit occupies a position far closer to the heart of the labor law
than does a defendant’s anticompetitive lawsuit in respect to antitrust law.” Id. at 543.
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reasonably based.” 173 Next, the Court construed the text of the NLRA,
finding no reason to read the Act “to reach all reasonably-based but
unsuccessful suits filed with a retaliatory purpose.” 174 However, the Court
did not decide whether the Board could “declare unlawful any unsuccessful
but reasonably based suits that would not have been filed but for a motive
to impose the costs of the litigation process, regardless of the outcome.” 175
Thus, although the Court did not apply the “sham” rule in the NLRA
context, it intimated that it would do so in a future case. 176
D. Labor Speech as Commercial Speech?
If, as the Court has suggested, labor speech is, at heart, economic rather
than political, then perhaps it should be grouped with commercial speech
for First Amendment purposes. In other words, just like a salesman selling
cars, perhaps a union representative talking to as-yet-unorganized workers
or the public is selling the benefits of unionism, or a bargaining agent trying
to obtain higher wages is selling members’ work. Such a categorization
may even have some advantages for labor speech. For one thing, it would
place labor speech within a recognizable category of First Amendment
protection. Moreover, inclusion in the commercial speech category would
be a promotion for labor speech because at least some commercial speech
currently is entitled to more protection than labor speech (though less than
political speech). 177 But does the commercial speech doctrine fairly
encompass labor speech in its various forms?
Courts have, at times, characterized labor unions as businesses, albeit
with specialized missions. For example, in Thomas v. Collins, 178 a case
173. Id. at 532 (majority opinion) (quoting Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S.
731, 743 (1983)).
174. Id. at 536.
175. Id. at 536–37.
176. Justice Scalia stated in his concurrence that the “implication” was that the Court
would, in the future, construe the NLRA “in the same way we have already construed the
Sherman Act: to prohibit only lawsuits that are both objectively baseless and subjectively
intended to abuse process.” Id. at 537 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia reasoned that
the NLRA, if anything, demanded higher standards to infringe petitioning activity because
the NLRA was enforced by an administrative body instead of an Article III court, and it was
doubtful that an administrative agency could be given the authority to punish a reasonablybased suit filed in a court. Id. at 537–38.
177. Unlike labor speech, commercial speech can be regulated only when it concerns
illegal activity, is misleading, or when it is tailored to directly advance a substantial
government interest that could not be served by a more limited restriction. Cent. Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980); see also James G. Pope,
The Three-Systems Ladder of First Amendment Values: Two Rungs and a Black Hole, 11
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189, 191 (1984) (“On the ladder of First Amendment values, political
speech occupies the top rung, commercial speech rests on the rung below, and labor speech
is relegated to a ‘black hole’ beneath the ladder.”); cf. Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union
Representation Elections, and the First Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356,
392 n.189 (1995) (“Labor speech ‘has been routinely treated as commercial speech subject to
virtually plenary regulation’ since Thomas v. Collins.” (quoting Craig Becker, Democracy in
the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV.
495, 599 n.496 (1993))).
178. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
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decided during a period when the Court was expanding labor speech rights,
the Supreme Court referred to unions’ “economic function” as no barrier to
First Amendment protection. 179 The Thomas dissent stated it more bluntly:
“Labor unions are business associations; their object is generally business
dealings and relationships as is manifest from the financial statements of
some of the national unions. Men are persuaded to join them for business
reasons, as employers are persuaded to join trade associations for like
reasons.” 180 Even if labor unions did have the same goals and functions as
a for-profit corporation, however, that would not end the inquiry. Rather,
whether speech falls into the commercial speech category is determined in
part by looking at the function of the speech, not just the identity of the
speaker. 181 Thus, the Supreme Court has characterized commercial speech
as “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience” 182 and as “speech which does ‘no more than propose a
commercial transaction,’ [and] is . . . removed from any ‘exposition of
ideas,’ and from ‘truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion
of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government.’”183
Under these definitions, speech that takes place at the bargaining table
could arguably qualify as commercial speech, if one accepts that speech
about the value of labor is analogous to speech about the value of goods.
The union, as the representative of its members, makes and responds to
proposals regarding wages and working conditions in much the same way
that a salesman and a buyer might haggle over the price of a good or
service. In contrast, comprehensive campaign speech that takes place away
from the bargaining table does much more than propose a commercial
transaction, and its intended audience extends well beyond potential union
members. For example, during the Smithfield comprehensive campaign,
the UFCW sought to tap into the general public’s sense of moral outrage
about the company’s employment and environmental practices.184 Further,
even if it could fairly be said that the UFCW was proposing an economic
transaction by asking members of the public not to buy Smithfield bacon,
that request was tied to dignitary, not economic, interests, which places that

179. Id. at 531.
180. Id. at 556 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Other courts have since taken a similar view.
E.g., Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 723
(1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (stating that “[t]he very purpose and effect of a labor union
is to limit the power of an employer to use competition among workingmen to drive down
wage rates and enforce substandard conditions of employment”).
181. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010)
(applying strict scrutiny to restrictions on political speech, even if speaker is a corporation).
182. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. at 561.
183. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976) (citations omitted) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n,
413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
184. See supra Part I.B.3.
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speech outside the scope of the Supreme Court’s commercial speech
tests. 185
It is unclear that organizing speech of any description should ever qualify
as commercial speech. 186 To be sure, one could characterize the
relationship between unions and members as an exchange of fees (union
dues) for services (representation). 187 But unions do more than sell a
negotiation service; they also offer a meaningful opportunity for members
to exercise their associational rights 188 and to acquire a social identity.189
Workers may also choose to join labor unions for a variety of reasons in
addition to the expectation of improved wages and benefits, such as a desire
to amplify their voices at work or in the political realm.
Finally, the reason for granting less First Amendment protection to
commercial speech is the supposed durability of that speech—that is, it is

185. In distinguishing commercial speech from other types of speech, the Court has
focused on both the content of the speech and the motivation of the speaker. This was made
most apparent in a pair of cases involving lawyers soliciting clients: In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412 (1978), and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). In the first, Primus
approached a prospective client/plaintiff regarding a suit over the coerced sterilization of
women who received Medicaid benefits. Primus, 436 U.S. at 415. Though Primus offered
her legal services for free, there was some possibility that the American Civil Liberties
Union, which sponsored the litigation, would be awarded counsel fees. Id. at 429–30. In the
second, Ohralik sought to represent car crash victims for a fee. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 450–51.
Nonetheless, the Court held that Ohralik’s solicitation was commercial speech, which could
be punished by the bar association in light of the state’s interests in protecting consumers
and maintaining attorney standards, id. at 437–39, while Primus’s solicitation was “political
expression and association” that could be regulated only narrowly to prevent specific harms.
Primus, 436 U.S. at 437–38. Acknowledging the unusual role that speaker motivation was
playing, the Court stated that “[n]ormally the purpose or motive of the speaker is not central
to First Amendment protection, but it does bear on the distinction between conduct that is
‘an associational aspect of ‘expression’,’ and other activity subject to plenary regulation by
the government.” Id. at 438 n.32 (quoting Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and
Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 26 (1964))). Thus, commercial speech was to be
distinguished from political speech based on not only its content, but also its motivation.
186. In DeBartolo, the Court made clear that it did not mean to “suggest that
communications by labor unions are never of the commercial speech variety and thereby
entitled to a lesser degree of constitutional protection,” but that the leaflets at issue were not
“typical commercial speech such as advertising the price of a product or arguing its merits.”
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 576 (1988). However, the decision did not give any examples of union speech that
would be of the commercial variety, and further, the Court did not say what type of speech
the leaflets were, if not commercial speech.
187. See, e.g., Aitken v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 496 F. Supp. 2d 653, 665 (E.D. Va.
2007) (“While union organizing certainly implicates First Amendment associational
interests, it is also true that CWA performs economically valuable services for its members
in exchange for a fee, namely union dues—an arrangement which has all the characteristics
of a commercial transaction.”).
188. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956) (noting that “[t]he right
of self-organization depends in some measure on the ability of employees to learn the
advantages of self-organization from others”); see also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534
(1945) (noting that speech and associational rights were at issue in case concerning
restriction on labor organizer’s speech).
189. See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor’s Identity Crisis, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1767,
1785–86 (2001) (describing the AFL’s recent attempt to cast the union movement in terms of
not only class consciousness but also as a social justice movement).
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less likely to be chilled by governmental restriction than political, artistic,
or other non-commercial speech entitled to full First Amendment
protection. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 190 the Court explained that durable commercial
speech required less First Amendment protection than other speech in large
part because of its profitability. 191 But this rationale does not translate to
either comprehensive campaign speech or other “organizing” speech.
Given that union dues average about $400 per member per year,192
comprehensive campaigns are unlikely to be profit-making ventures.
Furthermore, defending civil RICO suits can be extremely expensive.193
Thus, the possible chilling effect associated with making an incorrect
statement about an employer will be much greater than in the typical
commercial context.
In sum, even if the Court’s decisions are trending toward increased First
Amendment protection for labor speech, the Court has yet to place union
speech on the same footing as the speech of other social movements or to
present a coherent theory of the First Amendment as it applies to labor
speech. In the next section, I will argue that labor unions, like other civic
associations, contribute significantly to deliberative democracy, and, for
that reason, their speech should receive First Amendment protection
equivalent to that of other social movements.
III. CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The Court’s apparent reluctance to set forth a coherent or consistent
theory of labor speech and the First Amendment makes some sense in light
of the limited consensus as to what speech the First Amendment should
protect and, more importantly, why it should be protected. 194 To date,
“[t]he Court has not set out anything like a clear theory to explain why and
when speech qualifies for the top tier. At times the Court has indicated that
speech belong[s] in the top tier if it is part of the exchange of ideas, or if it
bears on the political process.” 195
Though the Court has never directly endorsed a conception of the First
Amendment that particularly values “civil society”196 and its contributions

190. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
191. Id. at 762–63, 771 n.24.
192. Mark Brenner, Give Your Union a Dues Checkup, LABOR NOTES (May 27, 2007,
10:54 PM), http://labornotes.org/node/908 (value for 2004; noting that union dues had fallen
by 8.4% from 2000–2004).
193. See infra Part IV.B.
194. Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1251–57 (1983)
(observing that the Court has been generous about finding First Amendment values and
employed an “eclectic” group of tests in various First Amendment contexts).
195. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 11 (1995).
196. Ernest Gellner defines civil society as
‘that set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to
counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the state from fulfilling its role
as keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless
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to democratic deliberation, there is a discernible strand running through
some of the Court’s free speech cases that seems to recognize that
associations are critical to the sound exercise of popular sovereignty. For
example, at least one scholar has suggested that Brandeis’s vision of the
First Amendment was based on civic virtue and that his classic dissent in
Whitney v. California 197—a case about speech at a meeting of the
Communist Labor Party, where members debated and voted on a series of
proposals related to the organization’s purpose and function198—speaks not
just to self-fulfillment or self-rule, but to “the duty to participate in politics,
the importance of deliberation, and the notion that the end of the state is not
neutrality but active assistance in providing conditions of freedom . . . .” 199
Similarly, Cass Sunstein argues persuasively that “[t]he placement of
sovereignty in ‘We the People,’ rather than the government . . . . created an
ambitious system of ‘government by discussion,’ in which outcomes would
be reached through broad public deliberation.”200
Thus, Sunstein and others have proposed a reading of the First
Amendment that focuses on deliberative democracy, including the need to
draw citizens into public life to exercise their right to self-governance, and
argues that speech that promotes deliberative democracy deserves robust
First Amendment protection. 201 Further, a wealth of legal and socialscientific scholarship argues that civil society (or associational life) is
critical to a well-functioning deliberative democracy. 202 In the next section,
I will explore the intersection of these arguments and propose that certain
labor speech should receive enhanced First Amendment protection. This
proposal is based on two premises: first, that a healthy civil society
prevent it from dominating and atomizing the rest of society[.] . . . Civil Society
can check and oppose the state. It is not supine before it.’
Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Civil Society 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 379, 380 (2000)
(quoting ERNEST GELLNER, CONDITIONS OF LIBERTY: CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS RIVALS 5, 193
(1994)).
197. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
198. Id. at 365.
199. Pnina Lahav, Holmes and Brandeis: Libertarian and Republican Justifications for
Free Speech, 4 J.L. & POL. 451, 460, 466 (1988) (“In Brandeis’ opinion, the potential
goodness of individuals acting collectively was the source of legitimacy for democracy, and
the reason he supported it.”).
200. SUNSTEIN, supra note 195, at xvi.
201. E.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 195, at 244–52; Martin H. Redish & Abby Marie Mollen,
Understanding Post’s and Meiklejohn’s Mistakes: The Central Role of Adversary
Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1303, 1303–04 (2009)
(“[A]mong the most prominent and widely accepted theories of the First Amendment are
those that explain the Free Speech Clause as either a catalyst for or a protection of
democracy itself. Such ‘democratic’ theories of the First Amendment posit that speech
receives constitutional protection because it is essential to a functioning and legitimate
democracy.”); see also STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 37 (2005) (describing “active liberty” as “the need to make room for
democratic decision-making”); Jason Mazzone, Speech and Reciprocity: A Theory of the
First Amendment, 34 CONN. L. REV. 405, 415–16 (2002) (noting growing emphasis on
Sunstein’s theory of deliberative democracy).
202. E.g., COHEN & ARATO, supra note 16, at vii, viii (noting that “the concept of civil
society . . . has become quite fashionable today” and arguing that civil society is “the
primary locus for the potential expansion of democracy”).
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contributes to deliberative democracy; and second, that labor unions are
rightly considered a valuable part of civil society. I will also explore how
associations, including labor unions, play a role in enhancing deliberation,
both by helping members develop the skills required to deliberate and by
providing literal and metaphorical space for deliberation. 203
A. The Role of Civil Society in Promoting Deliberative Democracy
Associations foster democratic deliberation in two distinct ways. First,
they participate directly in social debates by publishing position statements
or lobbying elected officials. Second, they create conditions in which
deliberation is likely to occur, or instill in their members values that make
them more likely to deliberate. This section explores whether and how civil
society either participates in democratic deliberation, or facilitates
deliberation by promoting conditions, such as freedom, equality, diversity,
and connectedness, under which it is more likely to occur.204
There are numerous accounts of the links between civil society and
democratic self-governance or deliberative democracy. 205 Those links can
be grouped into two general categories: first, benefits derived from what
the associations themselves do, including what members do in their role as
members; and second, benefits derived from what participation in the
association might prompt individuals to do in their other social roles. Put
more concretely, an association might lobby the government to pass
legislation—an example of an association’s direct participation in
democratic deliberation. Then, a member of that association might be
inspired to try to convince her city council to add more bus lines—an
example of an individual’s participation in democratic life that is a result of,
but distinct from, her participation in an association.

203. I do not mean to suggest that this is the only theory of the First Amendment under
which labor speech should be afforded top-tier protection. However, other theories are
beyond the scope of this Article.
204. Cynthia Estlund has called freedom, equality, diversity, and connectedness the “ideal
conditions” for democratic deliberation. Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The
Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 58 (2000).
205. For example, Jane Mansbridge theorizes that civil society allows for “deliberative
enclaves of resistance” or “counterpublics,” with a variety of goals:
‘understanding themselves better, forging bonds of solidarity, preserving the
memories of past injustices, interpreting and reinterpreting the meanings of those
injustices, working out alternative conceptions of self, of community, of justice,
and of universality, trying to make sense of both the privileges they wield and the
oppressions they face, understanding the strategic configurations for and against
their desired ends, deciding what alliances to make both emotionally and
strategically, deliberating on ends and means, and deciding how to act, idividually
and collectively.’
Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society-Revivalists, 75
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301, 318 (2000) (quoting Jane Mansbridge, Using Power/Fighting
Power: The Polity, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE
POLITICAL 46, 58 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996)).
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Although the two categories will significantly overlap in many cases, 206 I
will broadly group the democracy-enhancing benefits of civil society as
follows: first, associations acting as associations are better able to “check
and oppose” the state than individuals, foster interdependence and
cooperation in pursuit of a common goal, and provide a venue and thus a
reason for members to come together to deliberate. Second, associations
can be “schools for democracy” that improve members’ competence and
interest in participating in larger democratic life, even outside of the
association.
I will discuss these in turn and then discuss labor unions’ potential
contributions to civil society.
1. Associations and “Checking and Opposing” the State
In some undemocratic countries, civil society has literally opposed the
state in the sense of undermining dictatorships.207 In a democracy, though,
the relationship is more symbiotic: although civil society influences
governmental decision-making and moderates or counterbalances
governmental excess, government also protects civil society. 208 At most
then, as posited by Emile Durkheim, an early theorist of the value of
intermediate associations, associations may help prevent the state from
becoming corrupt. 209 Similarly, James Gray Pope has argued in the context
of the labor movement that “[m]odern constitutional theory relies on
organized groups to offset governmental power and prevent the rise of a
ruling class. Group independence has replaced individual independence as
the safeguard of democracy.” 210
2. Associations and Interdependence
For Durkheim, Alexis de Tocqueville, and others, associations were
crucially important for their ability to generate “social capital” and social
trust. 211 Robert Putnam defined “social capital” as “‘connections among
individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and

206. For example, when a member of an association goes knocking on doors to fundraise,
he is probably acting both as a member and as a neighbor. The same is true when a member
of an association drags a friend to a meeting.
207. GELLNER, supra note 196, at 193; Roy Godson, Labor’s Role in Building
Democracy, in PROMOTING DEMOCRACY: OPPORTUNITIES AND ISSUES 119, 123 (Ralph M.
Goldman & William A. Douglas eds., 1988) (describing labor’s role in undermining the
stability of regimes in Eastern Europe and in decolonizing African countries).
208. COHEN & ARATO, supra note 16, at x (noting that “it would be a mistake to see civil
society in opposition to the economy and state by definition”); Tushnet, supra note 196, at
399.
209. EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALs 3–5 (Cornelia
Brookfield trans., 1958).
210. Pope, supra note 93, at 1112.
211. Bob Edwards & Michael W. Foley, Civil Society and Social Capital: A Primer, in
BEYOND TOCQUEVILLE: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE SOCIAL CAPITAL DEBATE IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 1, 1 (Bob Edwards, Michael W. Foley & Mario Diani eds., 2000).
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trustworthiness that arise from them.’” 212 Its purpose is to “help people to
accomplish things together” by generating the trust necessary for
individuals to put self-interest aside, at least temporarily, to act collectively
for the common good. 213 In particular, associations have the potential to
bring people together both within and across social groups, generating
bonds of trust where there were none before and reinforcing those that
already existed. 214
A closely related concept is interdependence. When citizens depend on
each other for survival and success, they are more likely to form a real
community, where the needs of the group can sometimes be put above the
needs of the individual, with an unstated expectation of future
reciprocity. 215 Associations play a role in promoting interdependence in at
least two ways. First, they are microcosms of society, in that members of
an association depend on each other to make the organization successful.
Second, associations themselves are social actors, capable of depending on
others and being depended upon, as when they act in concert with other
associations to accomplish shared goals.
3. Associations as Places and Reasons To Come Together
Associations can simply provide a physical place and a reason for
individuals to come together to talk about great or small issues. Thus, in a
literal as well as a metaphorical sense, “civil society can offer a multiplicity
of spaces in which deliberative democracy, or public deliberation, can take
place.” 216 To the extent the Court has endorsed a view of the First
Amendment that cares about civil society and its relationship to deliberative
democracy, this has been the value that it has identified.
Specifically, the Court has endorsed the idea that citizens must come
together to deliberate about how to exercise their sovereignty. In De Jonge
v. Oregon, 217 a case involving a meeting of the Communist party, the Court
concluded that—at least when speech on “the public issues of the day” was
tied to petitioning the government for redress of grievances—“‘[t]he very
idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation.’”218 Likewise, in Thornhill, the
Court unanimously—if briefly—held that labor picketing was protected by
the First Amendment because it was “essential to free government” that
212. CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A
DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 114 (2003) (quoting ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19 (2001)).
213. Id.; see also Edwards & Foley, supra note 211, at 1.
214. ESTLUND, supra note 212, at 107 (describing Putnam’s concepts of “bridging”
associations, which bring people together from across different social groups, and “bonding”
associations, which bring together people from the same social group).
215. See ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 246–47 (1987) (describing the role of interdependence in
creating a real community rather than a “lifestyle enclave”).
216. McClain & Fleming, supra note 205, at 318.
217. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
218. Id. at 364–65 (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875)).
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“men may speak as they think on matters vital to them and that falsehoods
may be exposed through the processes of education and discussion.”219
Although it is not clear that the Thornhill Court thought “education and
discussion” could best occur within associations, 220 it would have certainly
been logical for the Court to have had associations in mind: the case arose
in the context of associational advocacy, and associations are necessarily
better at facilitating repeated and ongoing discussion between their
members than, say, chance encounters on the street. Further, the Court
cited the Continental Congress’s letter to the Inhabitants of Quebec, which
articulated the value of a free press as, in part, “‘its ready communication of
thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union among
them, whereby oppressive officers are ashamed or intimidated, into more
honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.’” 221
4. Associations as “Schools for Democracy”
Associations can also inculcate the skills and desires necessary to
become an active participant in deliberation on a larger scale. Accounts of
civil society and democracy often use as a starting place Tocqueville’s
observation that associations act as “schools for democracy” 222 by
cultivating certain experiences, attitudes, and abilities. For example,
associations may afford their members direct experience with democratic
structures—such as electing a president to lead the association—on a scale
that makes it easier to see the direct results of one’s contribution. Further,
to the extent an association’s membership is composed of individuals with
diverse backgrounds, experiences, and needs, individual members will
benefit from developing mechanisms to bridge differences and compromise.
Both types of experiences will, in turn, relate to politics on a larger scale.
B. Labor Unions and Civil Society
When it comes to inculcating the skills, not to mention the desire, to
participate in a deliberative democracy, not all associations are created
equal. It is implausible that the average cooking club is going to “check
and oppose the state.” Nor is it likely that the cooking club will teach
democratic values or help its members develop a sense of their own
political efficacy. To use another example, “it is hardly self-evident how
participation in bowling leagues nourishes the habits and skills of
citizenship, much less civic virtue and democratic self-government.” 223

219. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 102 (quoting 1 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 104, 108 (1904)). To
be sure, the Thornhill Court also articulated Holmes’s theory that freedom of speech was
valuable because it facilitated testing ideas in the “market of public opinion.” Id. at 105; see
also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
222. Thomas C. Kohler, The Overlooked Middle, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 229, 230 (1993).
223. McClain & Fleming, supra note 205, at 311–12. Professors Linda McClain and
James Fleming suggest that, to believe that “the barest indication of connection with others
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Labor unions, however, have some advantages over many other civil
society institutions when it comes to both checking and opposing the state
and acting as a school for democracy.
1. Unions “Checking and Opposing” the State
Unions can “channel[] grievances to the government and help[] to
explain and assist in the administration and maintenance of the political
system” by facilitating communication between citizens and the
government. 224 In the United States, unions have done so largely by
“seek[ing] change through political and legal channels” and “engag[ing] in
battles to transform cultural understandings.” 225 Thus, unions helped create
the public perception that work should be rewarded with “a ‘rate of pay
commensurate with an American standard of living.’”226 They were also
instrumental in the fight against Lochnerism that paved the way for laws
that improved working conditions. 227
Further, unions helped secure the “economic independence and material
security” that the Framers thought were necessary to meaningful
participation in democratic life.228 After the New Deal, unions “emerged as
the only powerful, organized constituency for social and economic
rights” 229 and helped secure passage of the wage and hour laws and
workplace safety protections. Now, unions are key players in national
debates over issues like national health care reform and free trade. 230
2. Unions Promoting Interdependence
Unions can enhance interdependence in at least two ways. First, they
make interdependence that already exists within workplaces more

[would] seem to support or even to relate to citizenship,” one would have to view people as
“atomistic individuals, unencumbered selves, or lone rights-bearers.” Id. at 353.
224. Godson, supra note 207, at 122.
225. Hawkins, supra note 31, at 76–77 (describing labor’s use of strikes to change social
expectations about working conditions); McClain & Fleming, supra note 205, at 319;.
226. FONER, supra note 21, at 199 (quoting 1937 collective bargaining agreement
between the UAW and General Motors, and discussing unions’ role in creating belief that
the Depression was caused by “underconsumption,” and that distributing wealth was
important to economic stability).
227. Id. at 59 (stating that, in the 1840s, courts viewed “any decision to labor for another
as a voluntary contractual agreement that allowed employers full authority over the
workplace,” while viewing labor unions as conspiracies); see also FORBATH, supra note 31,
at 1 (noting that American unions “never forged a class-based political movement to press
for more generous and inclusive protections” for all workers).
228. William E. Forbath, Social and Economic Rights in the American Grain:
Reclaiming Constitutional Political Economy, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 55, 55 (Jack
M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).
229. Id. at 60.
230. See, e.g., MLKCLC Labor Day Party, TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION # 174 (Aug. 31,
2009), http://www.teamsters174.org/news-archives/2009_july-august.htm (“The AFL-CIO
Union Movement is fighting for a unique American plan for secure, high-quality health care
for all that . . . [m]akes sure everyone gets high-quality health care as good as or better than
they have now.”).
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egalitarian. Second, they create new axes of interdependence among
members and between union leadership and members.
Because American labor unions exist in connection with workplaces,
they are influenced to a degree by the way workplaces are organized. In
turn, one of the defining elements of industrialized society is the
differentiation of labor, the primary characteristic of which is
interdependence. 231 Thus, “work is the chief—and again for many the
only—place outside the family where people are engaged in a common
undertaking.” 232 However, workplaces are also “involuntar[y]” 233 (in the
sense that employees generally have to work to live) and hierarchical. Both
traits can impede meaningful connection and undermine workers’
autonomy. 234 By helping to equalize the balance of power between
employers and employees, unions can improve workplace interdependence.
Once a workplace is unionized, the union and management must work
together for the company to be productive (which in turn enhances workers’
job security and benefits). 235 Not only does a unionized workforce present
the threat of a strike or other economic action, but, because a union contract
often makes it harder for an employer to take unilateral action, unionization
means that employers will have a greater incentive to maintain a
cooperative workplace. Further, whereas employment relationships in the
United States are generally severable “at will,” collective bargaining
agreements typically include a provision that permits employees to be fired
only “for cause.” They also limit the scope of what employees can be asked
to do and other aspects of their working conditions. Thus, unlike in
nonunion workplaces, where employees are heavily dependent on
employers but the reverse is not necessarily true (particularly for unskilled
employees), unionized employers must either work to win the “hearts and

231. In The Division of Labor in Society, Emile Durkheim identified the differentiation of
labor as an important source—perhaps the most important source—of social solidarity in
modern society, which he termed “organic solidarity.” This was precisely because of work’s
mandatory qualities: even individuals who did not have a family or participate in other
associations would probably have to work and, therefore, to depend on others and be
depended on. Thus, Durkheim saw joining a trade union as a moral good in itself. ERNEST
WALLWORK, DURKHEIM: MORALITY AND MILIEU 87 (1972). To foster that interdependence,
Durkheim advocated organizing society into “occupational groups,” which would function
as a kind of super-union or trade group. See ESTLUND, supra note 212, at 111.
232. Kohler, supra note 222, at 233–34. Kohler further argues that, “[g]iven the
importance of the work-life sphere in contemporary culture, the promotion of employee selforganization could serve as a buffer against the sort of fragmentation of the polity that
Tocqueville understood would deform and pervert a democracy.” Id. at 243.
233. ESTLUND, supra note 212, at 4.
234. Id. at 131.
235. Although the courts and others have typically thought of this relationship as
something like industrial warfare, e.g., Kupferberg, supra note 33, at 701–02 & n.76
(describing Congress’s intent in enacting the NLRA as protection of workers’ democratic
rights and reduction of “industrial warfare”), it can be more benignly characterized as
interdependence.
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minds” of their employees or risk becoming mired in endless disciplinary
proceedings and union grievances. 236
Unions also demonstrate internal interdependence, both between
members and union leadership and among members. As to the former,
although work may be involuntary, union membership is generally
voluntary. In “right to work” states, 237 employees cannot be required to
join labor unions at all (even though the unions are still required to
represent the interests of non-member employees fairly), and in other states,
employees in unionized workplaces can be required to pay, at most, the
“agency fee,” which is the portion of union dues that goes to
representational activities such as bargaining and defending employees in
disciplinary proceedings. 238 Further, in exchange for the right to be the
exclusive representative of a group of employees, unions are required by
law to operate as relatively formal democracies. The law protects the rights
of dissenters, and unions owe all members and agency-fee payers a “duty of
fair representation.” 239 Thus, even though labor unions are, like most
workplaces, hierarchical, they have less ability to squelch dissent and
dampen debate and deliberation than workplaces. 240
Moreover, when unions are functioning properly, they facilitate internal
interdependence because members must rely on each other (and their
elected leadership) to represent fairly the interests of the entire membership.
For a union to be effective, its members must be able to speak across the
negotiation table with a unified voice. For a union to maintain members,
those members must remain confident the union will go to bat for them
when they need its advocacy.
Finally, by virtue of their close relationship to workplaces, where
workplaces are relatively diverse, it stands to reason that labor unions will
also be diverse, particularly those unions that span multiple workplaces.241
As Cynthia Estlund has noted, workplaces tend to be relatively more
diverse than neighborhoods or voluntary associations, making the
deliberation at work more likely to include unfamiliar points of view.242
Correspondingly, a recent Center for Economic and Policy Research report
236. Further, with the rise of business unionism, unions and employers are probably more
likely than ever to be able to maintain a functional working relationship. In either event,
though, well-functioning unions increase employers’ dependence on their employees.
237. There are presently twenty-two right-to-work states, which are found mainly in the
southeastern and midwestern United States. See Right to Work States, NAT’L RIGHT TO
WORK LEGAL DEF. FOUND., INC., http://www.nrtw.org/rtws.htm, for a list of right-to-work
laws.
238. See generally Commc’n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
239. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, art.
I, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 401 (2006)). See generally Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171 (1967). Of course, unions are democratic to varying degrees. See Godson,
supra note 207, at 119 (noting that “not all trade unions are democratic”).
240. ESTLUND, supra note 212, at 14 (arguing that the hierarchical nature of most
workplaces suppresses their ability to create social capital).
241. Like workplaces, labor unions are subject to antidiscrimination laws, including Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006), and the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a).
242. ESTLUND, supra note 212, at 7.
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indicates that the labor movement is becoming increasingly diverse along
racial and gender lines. 243 Thus, labor unions, at least those where
members participate meaningfully in union affairs, can fulfill some of the
same “integrative” functions as workplaces—they too can “conven[e]
strangers from diverse backgrounds and induc[e] them to work together
toward shared objectives . . . .” 244 Therefore, to use Putnam’s terminology,
unions are both “bridging” and “bonding” associations.245 They are
bonding associations because union members generally share a
socioeconomic class and, in the case of local unions, a geographic area and
often a profession.
They are bridging associations because, like
workplaces, unions are relatively diverse as compared to other types of
associations. 246 Thus, the interdependence created at work and enhanced
by a union is likely to be broader and more inclusive than that created by
associations that are unconnected to the workplace.247
3. Unions as Places and Reasons To Come Together
Unions may be less effective than other types of associations at
physically bringing people together in a single location. Generally,
attendance at union meetings is non-mandatory, and—particularly if they
feel that the union is functioning well and serving their interests—members
may not be inclined to participate in union affairs.
This is not to say that deliberation never takes place among union
members. When it does, members will undoubtedly influence each others’
views on the political issues of the day. 248 And when union members take
collective action, such as striking or informational picketing, the level of

243. JOHN SCHMITT & KRIS WARNER, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, THE
CHANGING
FACE
OF
LABOR,
1983–2008
(2009),
available
at
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/changing-face-of-labor-2009-11.pdf; see also
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 19 (indicating that, whereas men used to belong to
unions at much higher rates than women, the “gap between their rates has narrowed
considerably since 1983”). Further, labor unions have become more diverse in terms of
representing more unskilled and semi-skilled workers than in earlier decades, when unions
tended to represent relatively well-off skilled workers. WILLIAM FORM, SEGMENTED LABOR,
FRACTURED POLITICS: LABOR POLITICS IN AMERICAN LIFE 40–41 (1995).
244. ESTLUND, supra note 212, at 129. It may be that, in some unions, participation will
be limited to a few committed members, so the potential integrative benefits of physically
coming together at the union hall will be minimal. However, data showing that union
members are more politically active than the general public suggests that union membership
is still valuable to deliberative democracy. Presumably, which aspects of union
membership—coming together to debate workplace condition and take collective action,
being part of an organization that participates actively in politics, having to think about the
welfare of other workers while negotiating contracts or processing grievances, or something
else—influence democratic citizenship and participation will vary among unions and
members.
245. Id. at 107 (citing PUTNAM, supra note 212, at 22).
246. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
247. ESTLUND, supra note 212, at 130.
248. Tushnet, supra note 196, at 399.
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deliberation is likely to be much higher. Public collective action also has
the effect of reaffirming and reinforcing social identity. 249
4. Unions as “Schools for Democracy”
Unions are frequently characterized as schools for democracy, 250 and
there is reason to believe that union membership contributes to political
activism. Traditionally, it has been the case that “[b]lue-collar workers . . .
are politically apathetic, or at least are less likely to vote . . . than their
parents.” 251 Union members, however, are more likely than the general
public to be registered voters, to vote, to try to influence others’ votes, to
support a candidate by displaying a bumper sticker or making a campaign
contribution, to care about election outcomes, and to follow public
affairs. 252
One reason for this level of participation may be that union members,
who elect union leadership (usually at both the local and national or
international level), are more accustomed to voting, running for office, or
participating in campaigning activity. 253 Further, because unions often
negotiate workplace protections, such as substantive and procedural
limitations on discipline and firing, 254 workers may feel more comfortable
participating in the political process if they know they cannot be fired for
their political stances. Benefits such as higher wages 255 and more time off
work also may contribute to workers’ ability to participate in the political
process.
249. Hawkins, supra note 31, at 74 (stating that “processions and festivals enlivened the
unionists’ efforts, proclaiming to all their public identity and social ideals with banners like
the New York GTU’s standard of Archimedes lifting a mountain with a lever”).
250. E.g., Godson, supra note 207, at 125.
251. Christopher Grant, Unions in a Fragmented Society, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 849, 850
(2002).
252. The ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior, AM. NAT’L ELECTION
STUD., http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/gd-index.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). It
is unclear whether there is a causal relationship between union membership and political
activism, and if there is one, which way it runs. On one hand, it may be that, given the
improved wages and benefits that come with unionization, employees have more resources
and time to devote to politics. On the other, it may be that the most politically aware
employees are also the most likely to perceive benefits of unionization, to be aware of the
protected status of labor organizing in the workplace, or to have the energy and motivation to
organize a union. Or, there may be a third factor that accounts for both phenomena. Carole
Pateman points to the sense of “political efficacy” or “political competence” as strongly
correlative to political participation, and those traits may also make unionization more likely.
CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 46 (1976).
253. Godson, supra note 207, at 125.
254. Cf. ESTLUND, supra note 212, at 130 (noting that “some employees are required to
listen and submit to others who hire them and could fire them, and who control their
advancement and conditions of employment” as a limit on workplace civil society); id. at
135 (noting that while collective bargaining “looks like a very pale version of democracy
and nothing like a republic,” it nonetheless “represent[s] the rule of law, the institution of
due process, and the opportunity for a real collective voice” in the workplace).
255. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 19 (showing that, among full-time
workers, union members earned a median of $886 per week, compared to $691 for nonmembers).
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The foregoing suggests that labor unions play a significant role in
promoting a robust civil society that checks the state and acts as a
democratic training ground. Thus, if one accepts that the First Amendment
broadly protects speech that promotes deliberative democracy, then labor
speech—in many of its forms—deserves top-tier First Amendment
protection. This is especially so in the context of comprehensive campaigns
and other organizing activity, where unions’ speech has significant potential
to enhance associational life. 256 In other words, where unions and workers
are actively involved in forming new associations and creating foundational
ties among one another, the speech that facilitates those associations is
important from a First Amendment perspective. Further, the claim that
union speech is “deliberative” has particular force in the context of
comprehensive campaigns. Comprehensive campaigns generally involve
appeals to the public or to government, and they often rely on their moral
force to attempt to convince otherwise-uninvolved people to act in a
particular way. Thus, the speech is likely to focus on dignitary concerns
(such as a particular employer mistreating workers), the benefits of
unionism to the community, or another matter of public concern.
Comprehensive campaigns have deliberative aspects even for
employers—who are, after all, the targets of those campaigns. Because
comprehensive campaigns are mainly aimed at the public, employers can
attempt to disarm them by taking to the public to both talk and listen. 257 If
employers are convincing, then presumably the public will ignore or
discount the union voices; if unions are convincing, then the reverse will be
true. Further, comprehensive campaigns are deliberative in that they are
aimed at convincing employers that it is in their own best interest (or,
possibly, the best interests of employees) to voluntarily agree to something
like a card check. That unions seek to do so by making it less pleasant for
employers to refuse does not necessarily make comprehensive campaigns
undeliberative. 258
256. However, organizing speech is not the only labor speech that has the potential to
enhance democratic deliberation. The need to bargain collectively will also bring union
members together to deliberate: For example, during bargaining, union members are likely
to discuss the merits and fairness of particular offers and counter-offers, and to vote on
whether or not to approve a contract. Bargaining speech, including picketing and secondary
activity, also has the potential to make workers feel empowered to, collectively, stand up to
management. The results of successful bargaining—increased wages and job security—may
leave workers with more time and money to participate in their unions, in other associations,
in their communities more generally, and in the political process. Finally, bargaining speech
may ultimately influence the outcomes of future organizing efforts, creating a virtuous cycle:
if a union has a long track record of bargaining that improves wages and working conditions,
it is more likely that the union will be able to attract new members within a workplace (in a
right-to-work state) or organize new workplaces. Thus, it is not the case that only organizing
speech, and not union speech more generally, promotes deliberative democracy.
257. For example, Smithfield ran a series of commercials in which workers touted their
good working conditions and radio interviews with Smithfield spokesperson and “celebrity
chef” Paula Deen.
258. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 4
(1996) (stating that “[a] deliberative perspective sometimes justifies bargaining, negotiation,
force, and even violence”). This is true particularly if comprehensive campaigns
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IV. FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES AND THINKING SMALL: HOW CIVIL RICO
POSES A GREATER FIRST AMENDMENT PROBLEM THAN NLRB
REGULATION OF SPEECH
I have argued that because labor speech can enhance the First
Amendment interest in deliberative democracy, it deserves the highest level
of First Amendment protection—the same protection that the Court
extended to the NAACP in Claiborne Hardware. 259 Because the NAACP’s
speech was significantly more coercive than the speech that has precipitated
employers’ civil RICO lawsuits, it seems clear that the speech involved in
comprehensive campaigns—at least campaigns free of violence or threats to
compel an employer to take illegal action—should be protected.
However, I do not argue that this conclusion necessarily requires the
Court to reverse all of its decisions upholding the NLRB’s authority to
regulate union and employer speech during organizing campaigns and the
bargaining process. First Amendment balancing analyses require courts to
weigh the benefits of the speech at issue against the benefits of limiting that
speech. 260 There may be good reason to differentiate regulatory restrictions
on union speech imposed and policed by the NLRB from civil lawsuits filed
by employers embroiled in labor disputes, given that regulation by the
NLRB yields different benefits and imposes different burdens than civil
RICO lawsuits. 261 As Harry Kalven has observed, “‘[t]o make a balancing
approach meaningful, we must think in narrower terms, recognizing that the
strengths of the competing interests may vary in new contexts.’” 262
Here, because the NLRB—although far from a model of administrative
perfection—seeks to protect employees’ rights to organize while ensuring
union legitimacy, the NLRB’s mission also furthers deliberative democracy
interests. Therefore, even after labor speech is afforded top-tier First
Amendment protection, the results of First Amendment balancing may
favor NLRB regulation over unimpeded speech. Employers’ civil RICO
lawsuits targeting comprehensive campaigns, however, are another story.
Though a civil RICO suit itself constitutes petitioning activity, it has a
inconvenience, but do not realistically threaten, the companies at which they are aimed. See
supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 140, 144–45.
260. Norman T. Deutsch, Professor Nimmer Meets Professor Schauer (and Others): An
Analysis of “Definitional Balancing” as a Methodology for Determining the “Visible
Boundaries of the First Amendment”, 39 AKRON L. REV. 483, 485 (2006) (observing that the
Court has conducted balancing in speech cases where First Amendment values were
implicated on both sides of the equation).
261. Though the Court has not endorsed this distinction—and rejected it in BE & K
Construction Co. v. NLRB—it seems to view restrictions on labor speech when criminal
penalties or hefty fines are at issue with greater skepticism than when faced with an
injunction. Cf. BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 541–42 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (arguing that, because antitrust penalties and litigation costs are greater than
those associated with NLRB enforcement proceedings, the First Amendment analysis need
not be identical).
262. Shiffrin, supra note 194, at 1215 (quoting Kenneth Karst, The First Amendment and
Harry Kalven: An Appreciative Comment on the Advantages of Thinking Small, 13 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 18 (1965)).
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chilling effect on union speech that has the potential to limit both union
speech and unionization itself, even where employees generally agree that
they would like to form a union. Thus, civil RICO lawsuits, if anything,
stymie deliberative democracy.
A. The NLRB’s Potential To Enhance Democracy
One could understand the NLRA, and the NLRB’s efforts to enforce it,
as an attempt to preserve the deliberative and state-checking benefits that
legitimate unions can provide. In In re General Shoe Corp., 263 the NLRB
concluded that its role was to “provide a laboratory in which an experiment
may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to
determine the uninhibited desires of the employees.” 264 In performing this
function, the NLRB “regulate[s] otherwise protected speech during
representation election campaigns” 265 to protect employees’ associational
interests, particularly in light of their economic dependence on their
employers. 266 These restrictions on unfair methods of either promoting or
discouraging unionization can deter abuses (by either side) that would
impair workers’ exercise of their associational rights. Thus, though it
involves restrictions on speech, 267 the “laboratory conditions” doctrine
enhances civil society, as well as employees’ First Amendment
associational interests. 268
Further, the threat of NLRB sanction is relatively unlikely to chill
legitimate speech. The NLRB cannot impose punitive financial penalties—
263. 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
264. Id. at 127; see also Shawn J. Larsen-Bright, Note, Free Speech and the NLRB’s
Laboratory Conditions Doctrine, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 204, 215 (2002).
265. Larsen-Bright, supra note 264, at 215; see also NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395
U.S. 575, 612 (1969) (concluding that NLRB may order employer to bargain with union if
employer has “succeeded in undermining a union’s strength and destroying the laboratory
conditions necessary for a fair election”).
266. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 778 n.3 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that the Court permitted more speech
restrictions in the context of labor elections than political elections to promote “antiseptic
conditions,” based on employees’ competing First Amendment associational interests and
dependence on their employers).
267. For example, during organizing campaigns, employers may not threaten to close the
plant in retaliation if the employees vote the union in (though employers may state that the
plant may close if the workers unionize, provided the statement is not motivated by antiunion animus), nor may they promise to improve working conditions or compensation if
employees reject unionization. See Julius Getman, Labor Law and Free Speech: The
Curious Policy of Limited Expression, 43 MD. L. REV. 4, 5–9 (1984).
268. Further, the NLRA is not universally speech-restrictive. In some contexts, the
NLRA takes an expansive view of unions’ and employers’ speech rights. For example, the
Court has repeatedly recognized that tempers run high during labor disputes, causing both
sides to make extreme statements. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114,
383 U.S. 53, 64 (1966). At times, the Court has even suggested that permitting such speech
could prevent violence by providing a way for labor combatants to blow off steam. Milk
Wagon Drivers Union of Chi., Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 296
(1941). Thus, the NLRA preempts defamation suits that do not meet the New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan actual malice standard because of the risk that state-law defamation liability
could “dampen the ardor of labor debate and truncate the free discussion envisioned by the
Act [and] . . . might be used as weapons of economic coercion.” Linn, 383 U.S. at 64.
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at most, it can order backpay and attorneys’ fees.269 Thus, even though the
NLRB can significantly burden speech by issuing an injunction that stops
the speech altogether, the cost to a union or an employer of “going over the
line” is relatively low, so even an active NLRB will not inadvertently chill
future employer or union speech very much. Ironically, then, the aspects of
the NLRB that render it ineffective at eradicating abusive labor practices
make its interventions in labor disputes less problematic from a First
Amendment perspective.
The NLRB’s potential to improve union legitimacy and enhance
workers’ associational rights can be seen in some of the existing labor
speech cases. For example, in NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.,270
the Court upheld the NLRB’s power to issue a cease-and-desist order
against a company that interrogated its employees about their union
sympathies and then facilitated the creation of an “inside union” that would
accede to the company’s wishes. 271 The Court rejected the company’s
argument that its speech was protected by the First Amendment, concluding
that the NLRB’s penalty was intended to protect workers’ rights to form a
“legitimate” union, not punish the employer’s speech.272 In terms of
promoting deliberative democracy, the result is the correct one, even though
it burdens the employer’s speech. It is unlikely that the “inside union”
would have performed any of the democracy-enhancing functions discussed
in the previous section.273 If anything, it would have been an object-lesson
in corruption and the inability of workers to come together to change their
situations through concerted action.274

269. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 152 n.6 (2002) (stating
that the “[Labor] Board is precluded from imposing punitive remedies”); Republic Steel
Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10 (1940) (describing purposes of NLRA as remedial, not
punitive); see also Estlund, supra note 3, at 1537. The NLRB’s position is that it has the
authority to order attorneys’ fees. Micah Berul, To Bargain or Not To Bargain Should Not
Be The Question: Deterring Section 8(A)(5) Violations in First-Time Bargaining Situations
Through a Liberalized Standard for the Award of Litigation and Negotiation Costs, 18 LAB.
LAW. 27, 39–40 (2002). However, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third and D.C.
Circuits have called this position into doubt. Quick v. NLRB, 245 F.3d 231, 255 (3d Cir.
2001); Unbelievable, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d 795, 805–06 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
270. 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
271. See generally id.
272. Id. at 477.
273. See Kate E. Andrias, A Robust Public Debate: Realizing Free Speech in Workplace
Representation Elections, 112 YALE L.J. 2415, 2459–60 (2003) (arguing that the NLRB
should be required to regulate employer speech to facilitate employees’ exercises of their
associational rights).
274. Likewise, the result in Building Service Employees International Union, Local 262 v.
Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950), was correct from the perspective of promoting legitimate civil
society. In that case, the Court upheld an injunction against a union that sought to coerce an
employer to coerce his employees to join the union. Id. at 540–41. A labor union that is
formed through coercion not only infringes the employees’ associational rights, but it is
unlikely to encourage further participation in union affairs. Since the benefits to deliberative
democracy come mainly from members’ robust participation in an association’s affairs, few
are likely to accrue in this situation.
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Likewise, from a deliberative democracy perspective, the Court’s holding
in Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, 275 the predecessor case to BE & K, 276 was
correct. In Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, the employer filed a state-court
lawsuit, seemingly to retaliate against employees who had filed unfair labor
practice charges with the NLRB and engaged in picketing and leafletting.277
The state-court suit claimed damages for mass picketing, harassment,
blocking the entrance to the restaurant, creating a threat to public safety,
and libel. 278 In response, the NLRB issued a new complaint against the
employer, charging that the lawsuit was filed in retaliation for the
employees’ exercise of their rights under the NLRA. 279 Weighing the
employees’ labor rights against the employer’s First Amendment right to
petition, the Court held that the NLRB could enjoin ongoing lawsuits only
when “the plaintiff’s position is plainly foreclosed as a matter of law or is
otherwise frivolous,” but that “the Board should allow such issues to be
decided by the state tribunals if there is any realistic chance that the
plaintiff’s legal theory might be adopted.” 280 However, once the suit had
concluded, if the employer loses or withdraws its state-court suit, then “the
employer has had its day in court, the interest of the State in providing a
forum for its citizens has been vindicated, and the Board may then proceed
to adjudicate the . . . unfair labor practice case.”281
The rule articulated in Bill Johnson’s Restaurants served to promote
deliberative democracy because retaliatory lawsuits have great potential to
disempower workers. For an employee who has exercised her associational
rights to change her working conditions—only to be forced to spend many
months or years defending a lawsuit—the clear message will be that the
exercise of her rights was not worth it. Further, even where lawsuits are not
enjoined, the possibility of a subsequent NLRB proceeding—particularly
one that has the potential to recoup attorneys’ fees—can have restorative
justice value.
If the NLRB’s mission was to impose rules and procedures that would
protect employees’ capacity to form unions, which would in turn contribute
to an effective civil society, one could sensibly object that it has largely
failed.282 The law governing union organizing and recognition is a
275. See supra notes 165–67.
276. See supra notes 168–76 and accompanying text.
277. Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 734 (1983).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 735–36.
280. Id. at 747.
281. Id. In BE & K, the Court stated that this language was dicta, and rejected it. BE & K
Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 527–28 (2002).
282. Notably, one of the reasons that unions give for running comprehensive campaigns
is that the NLRB process has failed to protect workers and create conditions under which
workers can form a union free of intimidation and mistreatment. One study suggested that
“almost one-in-five union organizers or activists can expect to be fired as a result of their
activities in a union election campaign.” JOHN SCHMITT & BEN ZIPPERER, CTR. FOR ECON. &
POLICY RESEARCH, DROPPING THE AX: ILLEGAL FIRINGS DURING UNION ELECTION
CAMPAIGNS
1
(2007),
available
at
http://www.cepr.net/documents/
publications/unions_2007_01.pdf.
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hodgepodge of unclear and shifting restrictions, and enforcement is hardly
swift. In addition, the NLRB has proven to be subject to instability tied to
its regular political “capture” by the executive branch, alternating between
periods of being sympathetic to labor and periods of being sympathetic to
employers. 283 These rules have hardly contributed to a robust union
movement.
However, the courts are unlikely to do any better, particularly in light of
the Lochnerism that still pervades labor law. 284 Further, because courts are
limited to the controversy before them, they would be left to overturn one
aspect of labor law here, and another there, resulting in a see-saw effect in
the balance of power between unions and employers. 285 Mark Tushnet
argues that “the idea that legal doctrine could stably distinguish among
internal activities that reduce civil society’s effectiveness and those that
promote it seem strained. . . . [C]ivil society’s institutions are likely to be
more dependent on legislative grace than protected by constitutional
law.” 286 Thus, where the legislative or executive branch attempts to create
conditions that will promote civil society, 287 it makes sense for courts to
defer to those judgments.
B. Civil RICO and First Amendment Balancing
In contrast to NLRB proceedings, civil RICO lawsuits can result in
judgments awarding treble damages and attorneys’ fees (and the attorneys’
fees are likely to be much higher than those in an NLRB enforcement
proceeding, given the costs associated with formal discovery, summary

283. See, e.g., James M. Owens et al., “Now You Have It, Now You Don’t”: The NLRB’s
Fickle Affair with the Weingarten Right and the Need for Congress To End the Controversy,
11 J. INDIVIDUAL EMP. RTS. 155, 156 (2004) (noting the “flip-flopping of the NLRB’s
decisions regarding the applicability of the Weingarten right to the nonunion workplace”);
Steven Porzio, NLRB Chairman Addresses Labor Law Reform at American Bar Association
Meeting,
UNIONS
AND
LAB.
L.
REFORM
BLOG
(Nov.
11,
2009),
http://www.efcablog.com/2009/11/articles/craig-becker-nlrb/nlrb-chairman-addresses-laborlaw-reform-at-american-bar-association-meeting/ (noting that NLRB “Chairman Liebman
argued that Congressional inaction has fostered ‘deep divisions’ and ‘controversy’ in labor
law and has ‘facilitated’ the NLRB’s ‘flip-flopping’ and ‘policy oscillation.’”).
284. Pope, supra note 93, at 1076 (arguing that the “black hole” of labor law “is traceable
to the commodity theory of labor dominant during the Lochner era”).
285. See, e.g., NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 617–18
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (agreeing to uphold NLRB’s finding that a union engaged
in an illegal secondary boycott “only because I am reluctant to hold unconstitutional
Congress’ striking of the delicate balance between union freedom of expression and the
ability of neutral employers, employees, and consumers to remain free from coerced
participation in industrial strife”). Alternatively, if it is correct that “judges don’t like labor
unions,” a steady erosion of labor rights could occur. See generally George Schatzki, It’s
Simple: Judges Don’t Like Labor Unions, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1365 (1998).
286. Tushnet, supra note 196, at 397.
287. The NLRA itself discusses the importance of labor unions to achieving industrial
peace and a just society. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (“The inequality of bargaining power
between employees who do not possess full freedom of association of actual liberty of
contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership
association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce . . . .”).
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judgment briefing, and the like). 288 For example, the Smithfield plaintiffs
sought $5,900,000 in “compensatory and consequential” damages alone,
and then asked that the amount be trebled and added to their (undoubtedly
substantial) attorneys’ fees.289 That is to say, even before attorneys’ fees,
Smithfield was seeking over ten percent of UFCW’s 2008 net assets.290 Of
course, the UFCW also generated its own attorneys’ fees during the course
of the lawsuit, which likely ran to many millions of dollars. 291 Therefore,
even if civil RICO lawsuits based solely on expressive activity are usually
unsuccessful, the threat of such a suit, by itself, has great potential to chill
comprehensive campaign speech. If unions waging comprehensive
campaigns are regularly targeted with “bet the union” lawsuits, few unions
will choose to—or be able to afford to—engage in them. 292
Further, civil RICO lawsuits are poor vehicles for advancing First
Amendment interests of any color, except insofar as lawsuits themselves
advance the First Amendment interests that the Court identified in BE & K:
airing “genuine grievances” and related information, particularly where the
subject of the lawsuit is a matter of public concern; “promot[ing] the
evolution of the law”; and legitimating the court system as the acceptable
way to resolve disputes in this country. 293 If civil RICO cases based solely
or primarily on expressive activity are unlikely to be successful, employers
will file fewer of them; however, that employers will be less likely to air
their grievances through civil lawsuits cannot alone outweigh the First
Amendment value of protecting the speech involved in comprehensive
campaigns.
If I am correct that my First Amendment analysis does not necessarily
affect the NLRB’s authority to restrict union and employer speech, then the
288. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006) (civil remedies include treble damages and attorneys’
fees).
289. First Amended Complaint, supra note 8, ¶¶ 1–4, at 91–92.
290. FORM LM-2 LABOR ORGANIZATION ANNUAL REPORT: UNITED FOOD & COMMERCIAL
WORKERS (Mar. 26, 2009), available at http://erds.dol-esa.gov/query/getOrgQry.do (search
for file number 000-056; then follow “Food & Commercial Wkrs National Headquarters”
hyperlink; then follow “2008 Report” hyperlink) (listing net assets of $159,521,604).
291. According to the UFCW’s LM-2s, the union paid Bredhoff & Kaiser PLLC, the firm
that represented UFCW and the individual defendants in Smithfield, $5,579,684 in 2008, the
year in which the Smithfield lawsuit was filed. Id. In the two previous years, UFCW paid
Bredhoff only $99,500 and $23,722, respectively. See FORM LM-2 LABOR ORGANIZATION
ANNUAL REPORT: UNITED FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS (Mar. 28, 2008), available at
http://erds.dol-esa.gov/query/getOrgQry.do (search for file number 000-056; then follow
“Food & Commercial Wkrs National Headquarters” hyperlink; then follow “2007 Report”
hyperlink); FORM LM-2 LABOR ORGANIZATION ANNUAL REPORT: UNITED FOOD &
COMMERCIAL
WORKERS
(Mar.
22,
2007),
available
at
http://erds.dolesa.gov/query/getOrgQry.do (search for file number 000-056; then follow “Food &
Commercial Wkrs National Headquarters” hyperlink; then follow “2006 Report” hyperlink).
These numbers only include fees attributed to “representational activities.”
292. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277–78 (1964) (discussing the
potential for a lawsuit to chill protected speech); Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech,
57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1192 (2005) (noting that “[s]peakers who are genuinely not
intending to facilitate crime might nonetheless be deterred by the reasonable fear that a jury
will find the contrary”).
293. BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
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potential for civil RICO suits to deter “illegitimate” union activity that
might undermine deliberation—activity that, for example, coerces workers
into signing a union authorization card against their will294—will be further
diminished. First, the NLRB will be able to police the same activity, and,
as a neutral third party, it will be less likely than an employer to attempt to
suppress legitimate union speech. Second, the NLRB will be able to
evaluate the entire context of the labor dispute, whereas a court adjudicating
a civil RICO lawsuit will have, at best, a limited ability to take into account
background like prior unfair labor practices committed by the employer. 295
Nonetheless, it may yet be the case that some labor speech has so little
value that it would not offend the First Amendment for the speech to form
the basis for civil RICO liability (assuming, of course, that the speech met
civil RICO’s statutory requirements). Speech could be low-value either
because it is false or because it is intended to compel illegal employer
behavior. I will discuss the First Amendment protection that should apply
to speech falling into these categories in turn.
1. False Speech
I have argued that comprehensive campaign speech should receive the
same First Amendment protection as civil rights speech.296 That includes
the “breathing space” created in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 297 which
held that untrue statements should not form the basis for liability unless
they are motivated by “actual malice.” 298 The Sullivan standard is
necessary to prevent union speech from being chilled for two reasons.
First, unions will rarely, if ever, be able to determine to a certainty that all
the information they receive about a company’s employment practices is
true. Second, speech about employers’ treatment of workers and the
potential to unionize a workplace should be regarded as speech on a matter
of public concern under Sullivan, for all the reasons described above. 299

294. By this, I do not mean union speech that educates workers about the value of unions,
which will often contribute to workers’ abilities to exercise their associational rights by
counterbalancing employers’ one-sided, anti-union statements. Rather, I refer to overtly
coercive or threatening speech, such as “sign this card or else.”
295. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244–45
(1959) (holding that NLRB has sole jurisdiction over activity that constitutes unfair labor
practices, even if the NLRB declines jurisdiction over that activity).
296. See supra Part III.
297. 376 U.S. at 285–87 (holding that the New York Times was not liable for defamation
when it published an NAACP-sponsored advertisement because it neither knew nor
recklessly disregarded whether the published advertisement was false). Applying this
standard to labor speech in non-NLRB proceedings will also have the advantage of
extending the same standard to union speech in all contexts, as the Sullivan standard already
applies under the NLRA, though as a matter of statutory interpretation rather than the First
Amendment. See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 65
(1966).
298. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80.
299. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985)
(declining to apply Sullivan standard to speech on matters of private concern, holding that
“[i]n light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public
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Further, because labor unions (like other organizations) typically cannot
maintain close control of unaffiliated protestors, liability should be limited
to statements that were actually made, authorized, or ratified by the
union. 300 This would leave, as potential bases for liability, “actually
malicious” statements made by the union (such as statements made on
“official” posters and flyers, and oral statements made by members of the
union leadership) or endorsed by the union, including, for example,
statements contained in reports or documents drafted by a union but given
to another entity for distribution.
2. Comprehensive Campaign Speech in Pursuit of an Illegal Goal
If a comprehensive campaign aims to compel illegal behavior through
false, actually malicious speech, the First Amendment provides no barrier
to the application of civil RICO (assuming its other requirements are
satisfied). When a comprehensive campaign employs speech that is either
true or at least not recklessly false, however, the question is more
complicated.
With some exceptions, the First Amendment usually does not inquire into
the speaker’s motives to assess the appropriate level of protection to assign
speech. 301 Truthful speech has First Amendment value, even when it is
motivated by an illegal goal. For example, the speech still has potential to
educate listeners about issues of public concern (and therefore at least some
listeners have an independent First Amendment interest in hearing the
speech), regardless of the speakers’ motives. 302 In any event, given that
comprehensive campaigns often involve a coordinated effort by individuals
and groups who may have different motivations (but who may receive
information on which they base their speech from a labor union), it will be
difficult, if not impossible, to attribute a single motive to all the expressive
activity involved in a comprehensive campaign. 303
concern, we hold that the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive
damages—even absent a showing of ‘actual malice’”).
300. This standard would be consistent with the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which provides
that
[n]o officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or
organization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible
or liable in any court of the United States for the unlawful acts of individual
officers, members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or
actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual
knowledge thereof.
29 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
301. Volokh, supra note 292, at 1192 (listing instances in which the Court has rejected
First Amendment tests that turn on the motives of the speaker).
302. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
756–57 & n.15 (1976) (holding that speech about drug prices had First Amendment value, in
part because of listeners’ First Amendment rights to receive the information).
303. This issue also arises in the context of assessing damages. If a court eventually finds
a civil RICO violation, it would then have to separate damages attributable to the illegal
speech from damages attributable to protected speech. If a court applied Claiborne
Hardware to social movements other than labor unions, this inquiry could be extremely
difficult.
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On the other hand, Giboney suggests that the First Amendment does not
protect expression aimed at compelling illegal activity, at least where labor
picketing is concerned. 304 But Giboney is not the end of the story.
Subsequent First Amendment cases, including Brandenburg, impose an
“imminence” requirement before “inciting” speech loses First Amendment
protection and call into question Giboney’s breadth. 305 Moreover, it is
possible to read Giboney narrowly, in a way that is largely consistent with
these later Supreme Court cases (including Claiborne Hardware). Finally,
Giboney relied on a “signal picketing” analysis 306—i.e., union members
would see a picket line and unthinkingly obey it—that does not necessarily
apply to comprehensive campaign speech.
In Giboney, the Court upheld a restraint on secondary picketing that
sought to compel the target company to violate state antitrust law—and
caused an immediate eighty-five percent drop in the target company’s
sales—even though the picketing consisted of truthful speech.307 Despite
the Court’s later broad statements about Giboney’s holding, 308 the narrow
factual situation presented in Giboney is consistent with Brandenburg’s
imminence requirement: 309 Giboney stressed the “clear danger, imminent
and immediate” that the union would succeed in its goal.310 Thus, in light
of Brandenburg’s “imminence” standard, Giboney should be read narrowly
(and later, more expansive glosses on Giboney by the Supreme Court
should be rejected), so that the only non-malicious speech that would lose
its First Amendment protection is speech that both poses a serious,
immediate threat to a company’s survival and seeks to compel the employer
to act illegally.
Under this standard, comprehensive campaign speech is unlikely to lose
First Amendment protection. Contrary to the picketing in Giboney,
comprehensive campaigns have—at least so far—failed to inspire an instant
response, at least among a large percentage of the target employers’
customers and suppliers. Therefore, in most cases, comprehensive
campaigns will not put employers in the same untenable position as the
target company in Giboney: they will not be forced to choose between

304. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949); see also Bldg.
Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 533, 541 (1950) (upholding
injunction forbidding union from attempting to compel employer to coerce his employees).
305. See supra notes 127–30 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 110–12 and accompanying text.
307. Giboney, 336 U.S. at 492–95 (describing picketing that informed the public that
Empire sold ice to nonunion peddlers).
308. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563–64 (1965) (stating that Giboney applied the
general principle that “[a] man may be punished for encouraging the commission of a crime”
in the context of a labor dispute).
309. Commentators have stressed the importance of the imminence requirement in
protecting speech, given that intent and likelihood of success are somewhat subjective. See
Volokh, supra note 292, at 1193 (stating that “the main barrier to liability under the
Brandenburg test has generally been the imminence prong”).
310. Giboney, 336 U.S. at 503.
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acquiescing in illegal behavior and imminent shutdown. 311 It is nonetheless
conceivable that, after a comprehensive campaign has been underway for
some time, its economic impact will begin to take a toll on an employer
such that the employer’s acquiescence in an illegal demand becomes
imminent. Still, given the availability of NLRB procedures to enjoin illegal
union activity at an earlier stage, this scenario seems unlikely. 312
CONCLUSION
Civil RICO lawsuits that seek to impose liability for labor unions’
comprehensive campaign activity expose numerous discrepancies between
the Court’s First Amendment treatment of labor unions and other seemingly
similar speakers. It is doubtful that the Court’s distinction between
“economic” speech and “political” speech was ever workable, given the
extent to which the two are intertwined in most people’s daily lives. It
certainly is not workable today, when labor unions and their members are
intensely involved in political advocacy over issues that will have great
impact on all workers and employers. Even if labor unions at one time
could command large swaths of the public to respect picket lines and other
union directives, those days are past. Thus, it is time for the Court to
update its labor speech doctrine. The Court should take seriously labor
unions’ positive effects on deliberative democracy and afford them the
same level of First Amendment protection that it has provided to the civil
rights movement.

311. One reason that comprehensive campaigns do not pose the same threat as the
conduct in Giboney is that, in Giboney, the union could enforce its call for a secondary
boycott by subjecting union truck drivers to “fine or suspension” for crossing the picket line
to deliver the company’s product. Id. at 493. By contrast, comprehensive campaigns appeal
to the public at large, over which unions have little influence beyond their powers of
persuasion.
312. A further desirable aspect of a labor law regime in which NLRB proceedings, but
not civil lawsuits, are available to employers being targeted by union comprehensive
campaigns is that, absent the additional incentive of forcing unions to incur significant
attorneys’ fees and the settlement value of a civil suit, employers will be less likely to
attempt to interfere with union speech that poses little threat to the employers’ interests.

